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 I 
Preface  
 
During its more than three decades of history, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has been consolidated as a fundamental instance for the protection of human 
rights in the continent. It has been an instance for the relief of hundreds of victims of 
human rights, and a promoter of important changes within Latin-America. Indubitable, 
the Inter-American Court has become a regional and international referent for the 
protection of human rights. However, in spite of all the developments, the Court and in 
general the Inter-American system of human rights still face the strong resistance and 
opposition from several States. Until now, the region still has 10 countries which have 
never ratified the ACHR, whereas from the 25 countries that have adopted the ACHR, 2 
have already denounced it, 3 have never recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court, and 1 more attempted to withdraw that recognition. Now, it seems that we can 
add the Dominican Republic to the list. Its Constitutional Tribunal, through the 
judgment TC/0256/14 of November 2014, ruled that the Instrument through which the 
Dominican State recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court breaches 
provisions of its National Constitution. This situation has been interpreted as the 
withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court. 
The purpose of the present thesis is to analyze the possible Dominican withdrawal from 
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Firstly, I will analyze the context under 
which the Constitutional judgment was decided in order to know the reasons that 
motivated the decision. Next, I will analyze whether the Dominican withdrawal, based 
on the Constitutional judgment, would comply with international law, Inter-American 
law, and Dominican law. Finally, I will analyze the possible implications of the 
Dominican withdrawal for the protection of human rights, for the Inter-American 
human rights system, and for the government of the Dominican Republic, if any. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Presentation of the problem  
1.1.1 The coming encounter of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the Dominican Republic 
On 28 August 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court or IACtHR) 
rendered its judgment in the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican 
Republic.1 This case is perhaps the Inter-American case against the Dominican 
Republic with the most important internal implications for the Dominican State during 
the approximately 16 years it has been under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
According to the judgment, after one year from the notification thereof, that is 
on 22 October 2015,2 the Dominican Republic will have to “provide the Court with a 
report on the measures taken to comply with [the judgment].”3 Nevertheless, on that 
date the Dominican Republic may become the newest State which withdraws (or at-
tempts to) from the jurisdiction of the Court. This may occur if the Dominican Govern-
ment follows the route marked by its Constitutional Tribunal through the judgment 
TC/0256/14 of 4 November 2014, in which that high Dominican judicial organ declared 
the Instrument of Recognition, which binds the Dominican Republic to the jurisdiction 
of the Court, in contravention of the Dominican National Constitution. 
1.1.2 The judgment TC/0256/14 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment TC/0256/14 is the outcome of the nine years 
Constitutional Review Procedure TC-01-2005-0013 (Acción directa de 
Inconstitucionalidad), lodged in November 2005, against the Instrument of Recognition 
of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction4 signed in 1999 by the President of the 
Dominican Republic in office at the time, Leonel Fernández. 
                                               
 
1 IACtHR, Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs (2014) 
2 IACtHR (2014) Press release 
3 IACtHR, Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs (2014), para. 512(22) 
4 Concept of contentious jurisdiction infra Chapter 1.7 
 2 
The core argument against the Instrument of Recognition is that it was signed 
only by the President of the Republic and without the approval of the Dominican 
Congress. Allegedly, this was in contravention of, inter alia, the powers of the National 
Congress to approve or disapprove international treaties, the National Sovereignty, and 
the division of powers established in Articles 3, 4, 37(14), 46, 55(6), and 99 of the 2002 
Dominican Constitution (in force in 2005). However, due to the promulgation of a new 
National Constitution in 2010, the Constitutional Tribunal studied the Constitutional 
Review based on the equivalent provisions in the 2010 Constitution (currently in force). 
That is, based on Articles 3, 4, 6, 26(2), 73 ab initio, 93(l), and 128(d).5 
After nine years of proceedings, the Constitutional Tribunal rendered its judg-
ment TC/0256/14, in which it concluded that i) the Recognition of Jurisdiction of the 
Court’s jurisdiction to be binding for the Dominican Republic must have complied with 
the requirements of the Dominican Constitution, and ii) that the sole compliance of the 
provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) regulating the 
recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction are insufficient to bind the Dominican Republic 
to the jurisdiction of the Court.6 For those reasons, the Constitutional Tribunal declared 
“[t]he unconstitutionality of the Instrument of Recognition of the [IACtHR]’s jurisdic-
tion signed by the President of the Dominican Republic on 19 February 1999.”7 
1.1.3 The Dominican withdrawal unfolds? 
The Constitutional judgment does not expressly mention the withdrawal of the 
Dominican Republic from the IACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction. Neither did it declare 
the nullity of the Instrument of Recognition nor what the legal consequences of its 
decision will be. On the contrary, the Tribunal just limited to declare the 
unconstitutionality of the Instrument of Recognition after a rather general analysis of 
domestic and international law principles and provisions. 
Seemingly, the clearest provision with regard to the effects of the Constitutional 
judgment can be found in paragraph 9.9. There, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that  
                                               
 
5 Text available in the Annex 
6 Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic (2014) Judgment TC/0256/14, para. 9.16 
7 Idem, First Resolutory Point (My translation) 
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[T]he recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of Justice [of the Dominican 
Republic], as well as the recognition of the binding force of the Court’s decisions by the 
Constitutional Tribunal [of the Dominican Republic], are based on the presumption of legality of 
the Instrument of Recognition [of the IACtHR’s jurisdiction]. However, it is necessary to point 
out that the contestation of the Instrument, through the present Constitutional Review, 
introduced a new factor that may entirely change that situation, in the event this [Tribunal] 
declares the unconstitutionality of that Instrument of Recognition.8 
In those lines, the Constitutional Tribunal anticipated that the binding force of 
the Court’s jurisdiction and of its decisions have been recognized by the Dominican 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal (only) because they have presumed the 
legality of the Instrument of Recognition, what changed when the Constitutional 
Tribunal declared the act unconstitutional. Hence, it seems that the Constitutional 
Tribunal suggested that now, the Court’s jurisdiction and the obligation of the 
Dominican Republic to comply with its judgments lack a formal legal basis. 
Additionally, the use of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties (VCLT) regarding the invalidity of treaties as one of the arguments of the 
judgment used by the Constitutional Tribunal,9 also suggests that one of the legal 
consequences of the judgment would be the eventual invalidity of the Instrument of 
Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, does this constitute the withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from 
the Court’s jurisdiction? In order to answer that question, we should focus our attention 
on how the Dominican Government will interpret and implement the judgment. 
In October 2014, before the Constitutional judgment, the Dominican Foreign 
Minister, Andrés Navarro, stated that the Dominican Republic had not considered the 
withdrawal from an international organization.10 Whereas in November, a few days 
after the Constitutional Tribunal released its judgment, the Minister stated that the 
Dominican Government would comply with the Constitutional judgment,11 and that the 
Foreign Ministry was working on the different scenarios that the Dominican State could 
                                               
 
8 Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic (2014) Judgment TC/0256/14, para. 9.9 (My trans-
lation) 
9 Idem, paras. 9.4-9.6 
10 Hoy Digital (2014)  
11 Agramonte (2014)  
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adopt after the Constitutional judgment.12 Among these scenarios was “whether it is 
worth or not [for the Dominican Republic] to recognize the Court.”13 Similarly, the 
Minister referred that “it was not only the Government, but also the Constitutional 
Tribunal, who made a statement […] with regard to the permanence [of the Dominican 
Republic] under the Court’s jurisdiction, what demonstrates that this was a decision 
from the whole State, not only of the Government.”14 
Certainly, even when there is no official decision from the Dominican 
Government on whether the Dominican Republic will withdraw from the Court or not, 
the Government statements suggest that at least it is a real possibility. Under these 
circumstances, I believe that the most likely scenario is that the Dominican Government 
is just trying to make it clear that if necessary, it would not hesitate to take that route. 
In any event, I consider that the lack of a final decision from the Dominican 
Government on the question should not be underestimated. The judgment TC/0256/14 
clearly challenges the authority of the Court and binding force of its decisions, and the 
Dominican Government has shown an unprecedented opposition against the Court after 
the judgment in the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians. All these factors sug-
gest that there is a potential risk for the Constitutional judgment to become the first step 
towards the withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from the Court’s jurisdiction. This 
would lead to serious implications on the protection of human rights in that country, and 
for the consolidation of the regional system as a whole. 
1.1.4 Human rights research 
Although the particular Dominican withdrawal from an international court is closely 
related to other areas of law, like international law and constitutional law, my thesis is 
fundamentally a human rights research. Independent of whether the Constitutional 
judgment is strictly a legal issue regarding the constitutionality of the Instrument of 
Recognition, or what it seems, a legal artifice to avoid the compliance with the Court’s 
judgments, the consequences directly affect the effectiveness of the Court’s relief. For 
that reason, the study of the situation is enormously important for the consolidation of 
                                               
 
12 Listín Diario (2014) 
13 Jiménez (2014)  
14 Caminero (2014) 
 5 
the regional system, since the Court represents the highest instance for the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms available in Latin America.  
Therefore, due to the relation between the Constitutional judgment and its po-
tential repercussions for the human rights protection, and my particular interest in the 
Inter-American court system that began with my internship at the IACtHR in 2014, I 
have decided to write my thesis on the ongoing Dominican situation. I believe that if we 
want to build a strong regional human rights system, the Dominican opposition to the 
Court’s jurisdiction should be closely followed, studied, and prevented. 
1.2 Research questions 
The Constitutional Tribunal relied on principles of international law like the rules of 
invalidity of treaties in order to support its decision,15 whereas at the same time, the 
Tribunal dismissed the applicability or omitted the analysis of other principles that 
could have challenged its final decisions. For instance, estoppel, and forum proroga-
tum.16 In any event, the outcome was the declaration of unconstitutionality of the In-
strument of Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction by the Constitutional Tribunal, 
which is apparently leading to the Dominican withdrawal from the Court. 
However, I have doubts on whether the Dominican withdrawal would comply 
with international and Inter-American law, as the Constitutional Tribunal seems to sug-
gest. As asserted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission), 
the “[Constitutional] judgment has no legal basis in international law, for that reason it 
cannot produce legal effects.”17 Therefore, the main purpose of the present research is 
to assess the compliance of the Dominican withdrawal with the aforementioned and 
other principles of international and Inter-American law, and when applicable with 
Dominican law. 
In the light of the above, the research question I have formulated for the present 
thesis is: 
                                               
 
15 Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic (2014) Judgment TC/0256/14, para. 9.9 
16 Idem, para. 9.7 
17 Commission (2014) Press release 2014-130 (My translation) 
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Would the withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from the contentious jurisdic-
tion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights comply with international 
law, Inter-American law, and Dominican law? 
Additionally, I consider that the sole legal assessment of the Dominican with-
drawal without taking into account its context and consequences distorts the value and 
importance of the analysis for the human rights protection within the Inter-American 
human rights system. 
For this reason, I have also formulated two sub-research questions: 
1. What is the Dominican and regional context under which the Constitu-
tional judgment was decided (underlying causes)? 
2. What are the possible implications if the withdrawal is consummated 
(potential consequences)? 
1.3 Hypothesis 
My hypothesis for the main research question is: the withdrawal of the Dominican Re-
public from the IACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction would breach international law, In-
ter-American law, and domestic legal provisions, based on three assumptions. 
Firstly, neither the ACHR nor domestic law establish the requirement of ratifica-
tion for the recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction to be valid and produce 
legal effects. The ACHR does not lay down any specific requirement, besides the act of 
notification of accession at any moment by the Parties to the ACHR. Thus, I argue that 
the sole signature of the Dominican President at the time, and the notification to the 
Organization of American States (OAS) are sufficient for the Recognition of the 
Court’s jurisdiction to bind the Dominican State under the ACHR. 
Secondly, international law, Inter-American law, and Dominican law recognize 
the special hierarchy of international obligations, particularly fundamental international 
human rights obligations such as those arising from the ACHR. For that reason, the 
obligations derived from the Instrument of Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, an 
act regulated by international law and the ACHR, must prevail over domestic law, even 
in case of conflict with the Dominican Constitution. 
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Thirdly, the eventual withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction would contravene a series of principles and rules of public in-
ternational law and of the Inter-American human rights system. Among these princi-
ples, I will address the power of the IACtHR to decide on its own jurisdiction (compé-
tence de la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz); the principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and good faith, and the rules for the invalidity of treaties; and principles related to 
State’s conduct, consent and acquiescence. 
1.4 Methodology 
The present research focuses primarily on the assessment of the compliance of the Do-
minican withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction with international law, Inter-
American law, and Dominican law. This requires taking into account the international 
obligations of the Dominican Republic, principles and rules of international and Inter-
American legal frameworks, and the interaction thereof with legal provisions of Domin-
ican law. For that reason, I consider that a positivist method based on the notion of vol-
untarism is the approach which best allows me to analyze the interaction between those 
bodies of law. The voluntarism approach lies in the assumption that the States’ acts and 
consent create international norms and obligations, which at the same time prevent 
States from unilaterally withdrawing from those obligations.18 Therefore, given that the 
present thesis is concerned with the withdrawal from international undertakings, namely 
the Dominican withdrawal from its obligations under the Inter-American human rights 
court system, I consider that voluntarism provides an appropriate approach for address-
ing this problem. Then, I believe that by analyzing the international commitments and 
domestic legal provisions of the Dominican Republic, I will be able to answer whether 
the withdrawal complies with those bodies of norms. 
Additionally, the present thesis also deals with a series of sub-issues that go be-
yond the sole legal assessment of the Dominican withdrawal from the Court. For in-
stance, I already cited some political statements from the Dominican Foreign Minister 
in order to understand how the Dominican Government is planning to implement the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment. Similarly, I will also deal with the context of the 
                                               
 
18 Simma and Paulus in Ratner (2006) p. 25  
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judgment within and outside the Dominican Republic, and its potential implications for 
the protection of human rights and for the Dominican Government itself. Therefore, I 
consider that my thesis employs a non-doctrinal approach that includes other disciplines 
as aids to the legal research.19 It implies that in order to understand the possible real 
motivation behind the Constitutional judgment, I will have to address the political be-
havior20 of the Dominican State vis-à-vis the judgments from the IACtHR and the Hai-
tian immigration in the Dominican territory that seems connected to Dominican with-
drawal. Whereas in order to anticipate the possible consequences if the Dominican Re-
public unilaterally withdraws from the Court’s jurisdiction, I will have to address the 
precedents of withdrawals and the regional response in those cases. 
In sum, the present research requires a legal methodology in order to assess the 
Dominican withdrawal, complemented with a contextual analysis of its causes and pos-
sible consequences. 
1.5 Sources 
Due to the nature of the research goals, the present thesis will rely almost entirely on 
qualitative sources, except for some references to quantitative data regarding the situa-
tion of the Haitian immigration in the Dominican Republic in Chapter 2. 
With regard to the legal sources (qualitative). I will give priority to those so-
called formal sources of law21 binding on the Dominican Republic. For the international 
sources, I will follow the criteria laid down by Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) as the most accepted exhaustive list of sources of 
international law.22 Therefore, I will refer to treaty-law, principles of international law, 
and subsidiary sources under the ICJ Statute, such as judicial decisions from the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) and the IACtHR, and scholarly literature. Additionally, I 
will also rely on non-binding documents (soft-law sources)23 to the extent that they 
could complement the understanding of particular legal issues.24 For instance, I will 
                                               
 
19 McConville (2007) p. 5  
20 Abbott in Ratner (2006) p. 129 
21 Thirlway in Evans (2014) p. 92-93 
22 Thirlway (2014) p. 6 
23 Hoffman (2008) p. 7  
24 McConville (2007) p. 3 
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refer to constitutive elements in the formation of customary international law (United 
Nations General Assembly declarations, or proposals of the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC)) in Chapter 3 for the analysis of the binding force of unilateral acts as 
sources of international obligations. 
With respect to domestic legal sources (Dominican and other Latin-American 
countries), considering that the parties to the ACHR are of civil legal tradition, includ-
ing the Dominican Republic, I will prioritize as domestic primary sources the national 
constitutions and laws, and as secondary sources I will take into account judgments 
from high tribunals (Supreme Courts or Constitutional Courts).25 
With respect to the contextual analysis of the Constitutional judgment and the 
possible implications of the Dominican withdrawal, I will also rely on qualitative non-
legal sources. For instance, I will refer to official press releases of Inter-American or-
gans, declarations of NGOs, statements from Dominican authorities formulated through 
official sites, and press. 
1.6 Structure 
After the current introductory Chapter in which I present the background of the Domin-
ican withdrawal, the methodological framework, and the thesis’ structure, I will move 
to Chapter 2 concerning the context of the Constitutional judgment TC/0256/14. I will 
address this from three angles. First, the participation of the Dominican Republic in 
contentious cases before the Court; second the context of the Haitian immigration; and 
third the precedents of withdrawals from the ACHR and from the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Following the presentation of the context, Chapter 3 provides the legal analysis 
of the compliance of the Dominican withdrawal with international law, Inter-American 
iaw, and applicable Dominican law. Then, in Chapter 4, I will address the possible im-
plications if the Dominican Government decides to carry out the withdrawal. This will 
cover the implications for individuals, for the Inter-American system of protection of 
human rights, the possible sanctions for the Dominican Republic at the OAS level, and 
the remaining alternatives of human rights scrutiny within the OAS system and at the 
international level. Finally, I will present my conclusions. 
                                               
 
25 Hoffman (2008) p. 30 
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1.7 Definitions 
Contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR.- Alongside the advisory jurisdiction,26 the IAC-
tHR exercises the contentious jurisdiction. The contentious jurisdiction constitutes the 
ordinary form of jurisdiction of the IACtHR,27 under which it decides on whether a 
State has violated the human rights of individuals in a particular case.28 
 
                                               
 
26 ACHR Article 64 
27 IACtHR, Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., Order of the President (1981) Separate Opinion Judge Piza 
Escalante para. 4 
28 Pasqualucci (2013) p. 10 
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2 The Dominican withdrawal in context (causes) 
2.1 The Dominican Republic before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 
The Dominican Republic is party to the ACHR since 19 April 1978, and accepted the 
Court’s contentious jurisdiction on 25 March 1999, when its Permanent Representative 
at the OAS deposited the Instrument of Recognition signed by the Dominican President 
Leonel Fernández on 19 February 1999. 
Thus, with the necessary requirements fulfilled, the Commission, since 2003 
until now, has referred four cases against the Dominican State. The first application was 
the Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico lodged in July 2003. The case concerned, among 
other violations, the breach of the Right to Nationality protected under Article 20 
ACHR in detrimental to children with Haitian origin, because the Dominican 
Government “refused to issue birth certificates […] even though [the victims] were 
born within the [Dominican] territory and that the Constitution of the Dominican 
Republic […] establishes the principle of ius soli.”29 The second contentious case was 
González Medina and Family referred by the Commission in May 2010. This case 
concerned the forced disappearance of a university professor and opposition leader.30 
The third application was the Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. submitted by the 
Commission in February 2011. This case related to the alleged breach of the right to 
life, humane treatment and judicial guarantees of Haitians nationals who were victims 
of an excessive use of force by the Dominican military.31 The Court found the 
Dominican Republic responsible for human rights violations in all the three above-
mentioned cases. 
The fourth contentious application was the Case of Expelled Dominicans and 
Haitians. The Commission submitted the application of the case in July 2012. The case 
                                               
 
29 IACtHR, Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs (2005) para. 3 
30 IACtHR, Case of González Medina and Family v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Mer-
its, Reparations and Costs (2012) para. 2 
31 IACtHR, Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations and Costs (2012) 
para. 1 
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involves the “‘arbitrary detention and summary expulsion from the territory of the 
Dominican Republic’ of […] Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent […] without 
following the expulsion procedure set out in domestic law.”32 Additionally, the case 
also relates to the deprivation of the generation of identity documents and from 
obtaining Dominican nationality for persons, including children, with Haitian origin and 
born in Dominican territory.33 
Through its judgment of 28 August 2014, the Court found several judgments 
(from the Constitutional Tribunal itself), and different pieces of legislation (including 
the National Constitution) in contravention with the ACHR. As a result, the Court 
ordered the Dominican Republic to, inter alia, adopt measures for the registration and 
generation of identity documents for the victims, to allow one of the victims with 
Haitian origin to reside in Dominican territory, and to adopt legislative measures 
(constitutional if necessary) to ensure to every newborn in the territory of the 
Dominican Republic (jus soli) an accessible and simple birth registration.34 
In the light of the unprecedented broad scope of reparations ordered by the 
Court, it can be stated that this case is indubitably the most relevant contentious case 
against the Dominican Republic until now. If implemented, it would certainly have 
deep implications on the Dominican migratory policies. 
Before moving to the next section, I would like to highlight that three out of the 
four contentious cases against the Dominican Republic relate to violations committed 
against Haitians or Dominicans with a Haitian background. Moreover, two of the cases 
were particularly related to issues concerning the Right to Nationality of children with 
Haitian background. Thus, it is clear that the inadequate treatment of the Haitian immi-
gration by the Dominican Government has been the main cause why the Court has tried 
the Dominican Republic. For this reason, I will explore in the next section whether the 
Inter-American scrutiny of the Dominican migratory policies motivated the Constitu-
tional ruling that declared unconstitutional the adhesion of the Dominican Republic to 
the Court’s jurisdiction. 
                                               
 
32 IACtHR, Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs (2014) para. 1 
33 Ibidem 
34 Idem, para. 512 
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2.2 The real motivation of the Dominican Republic? 
On 4 November 2014, after nine years of proceedings, the Dominican Constitutional 
Tribunal released its judgment TC/0256/14 which declared the unconstitutionality of 
the Instrument of Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction. It was decided in a very 
peculiar moment, just after less than two weeks from the date the Court notified its 
judgment of the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians. Perhaps, as mentioned 
before, this Inter-American judgment against the Dominican Republic has the strongest 
legal implications in its sixteen years of history under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Therefore, I consider that the obligated question is whether there is a relation of 
causality between the two decisions.  
In that respect, the dissenting opinion of Judge Jiménez Martínez, member of 
Constitutional Tribunal, provides some interesting insights on that possibility. The 
Dominican Judge stated that 
We must indicate that the present judgment has been decided under a historical context, in which 
our country [the Dominican Republic] has been condemned by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and that, in our opinion, responds more to an act of reaction than legal reasoning; 
situations like those which have constituted the shameful way-out that in other countries it has 
been given under similar circumstances, with the clear difference that where this has occurred, it 
has never been promoted by a Constitutional Justice organ, as it has happened in the Dominican 
case, what deeply concerns us.35 
Clearly, what the Judge Jiménez Martínez was referring to was the historical 
context of the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians. 
This seems to coincide with the strong opposition of the Dominican Authorities 
against that ruling by the IACtHR. The Dominican Foreign Minister declared after the 
notification of the Court’s judgment that the Dominican Republic “every country has 
the right to define the mechanism to grant citizenship, […] and that sovereign decision 
cannot be interpreted under any circumstances as a denial of the respect of human 
rights.”36 The Minister added that the Dominican Republic “cannot accept the terms of 
                                               
 
35 Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic (2014) Judgment TC/0256/14, Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Katia Miguelina Jiménez Martínez, para. 4.2.12 (My translation) 
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the ruling.”37 Similarly, the former Dominican President Leonel Fernández, who 
actually signed the Instrument of Recognition, stated before the OAS in November 
2014, that the judgment from the Court against the Dominican Republic “constitutes a 
clear infringement of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic” and “that the 
Dominican State is impeded to comply with the decision.”38 
To understand this opposition, we need necessarily to take into account the 
delicate history of migration between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
 
Island of Hispaniola39 
 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic apart from sharing the Caribbean island of 
Hispaniola, they also share a long history of immigration primarily motivated by 
economic reasons.40 This is understandable due to the enormous social and economic 
differences between the two countries. According to the 2014 statistics from the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Dominican Republic was ranked in the 
                                               
 
37 Cited in Hoy Digital (2014) (My translation) 
38 Speech available in Diario Libre (2014) (My translation)  
39 Encyclopædia Britannica (2015) 
40 ECLAC (2010) p. 9 
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102nd position among the nations evaluated in the Human Development Index, this 
places the Dominican Republic in the category of countries with a High Human 
Development, whereas Haiti was ranked 168, among the countries with Low human 
development.41 Moreover, according to the World Bank (WB) statistics, the Poverty 
headcount ratio of the Dominican Republic represented in 2012 the 40.9% of 
population,42 whereas in Haiti it represented the 58.5% in the same year.43 Similarly, in 
2013, the Gross National Income per capita in the Dominican Republic was $5,770.00 
USD,44 whereas the Haitian was only $810 USD.45  
Now, according to the last Dominican national census of 2010, the number of 
people born in Haiti and living in the Dominican Republic was 311,969 out of the 
9,445,281 people who represented the total population in the Dominican Republic.46 
Moreover, if we consider that the total number of people born abroad and living in the 
Dominican Republic in 2010 was 395,791 people,47 then the Haitian minority represents 
approximately the 78% percent of the total foreigners living in the Dominican Republic. 
Nevertheless, the scenario is even more complex. The Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) recognizes that there is no final consensus on the 
real number of people with Haitian background living in Dominican territory. The 
studies quoted by the ECLAC go from 200 thousand up to 2 million people.48 This 
outlook shows the complexity of the Haitian immigration in the Dominican Republic. 
Moreover, although there are positive actions of solidarity from the Dominican 
Republic to the difficult situation of Haiti particularly after the devastating earthquake 
of 2010,49 the massive immigration has also led to unfortunate attitudes and policies 
from the Dominican Government against Haitian population in many occasions. In that 
respect, the Office of the UNDP in the Dominican Republic has referred that the “most 
of [the Haitians in the Dominican Republic] are undocumented and must face a 
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43 WB statistics available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/haiti  
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47 Idem, p. 98 
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generally hostile political and social situation.”50 For its part, the Court has recognized 
the existence of “a situation […] in the Dominican Republic in which Haitians and 
persons born in Dominican territory of Haitian descent, who were usually 
undocumented and living in poverty, frequently suffered abuse or discrimination, 
including from the authorities, which exacerbated their situation of vulnerability.”51 
Whereas the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has 
referred to the “recurring reports of mass, indiscriminate and arbitrary deportations of 
citizens of Haitian origin,”52 and to certain measures which “lead to a situation of 
statelessness [for Dominicans of Haitian background].”53 
In my opinion, the historical context appears to show that the Constitutional de-
cision may constitute a response to the recent Court’s judgment in the Case of Expelled 
Dominicans and Haitians. If so, it makes the Constitutional Ruling a legal justification 
for an anticipated non-compliance of the Dominican Republic with the Inter-American 
judgments, and a confirmation of the historical context of violations committed against 
the persons with Haitian origin. 
2.3 Latin-American precedents of denunciations and withdrawals 
In words of Úbeda De Torres, “[t]he main reason for the difference between th[e Inter-
American] system and the European one, however, lies in the fact that the American 
states are not ready to make court control fully operational. For them, State sovereignty 
clearly prevails and this highlights the weaknesses of the Court, which is obliged to 
recognize it.”54 Certainly, no regional system of human rights has experienced such a 
number of withdrawal or attempted withdrawals as the Inter-American system. The 
African system established its court less than ten years ago and has had no withdrawals. 
The European system has only experienced the withdrawal of Greece in 1969 during its 
Military Junta, however Greece rejoined the European system just after 5 years in 
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1974.55 In contrast, the Inter-American system has been subject of two denunciation of 
the ACHR, one attempted withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction, and several threats 
of withdrawals.56 To that history of denunciations and withdrawals within the Inter-
American system, we must now add what seems to be the new attempt of withdrawal of 
the Dominican Republic, which beyond its technical peculiarities, appears to emulate 
the route that other governments of the region. In the present Section, I will briefly 
address those regional precedents. 
i) Trinidad and Tobago 
Similar to the current context of political opposition against the Court’s 
decisions in the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago frustrated by the resolutions 
from the Commission thwarting death sentences in violation of the right to due process, 
decided to denounce the ACHR in May 1998.57 This became effective after a one-year 
period (May 1999) as established by Article 78(1) ACHR. The justification put forward 
by Trinidad and Tobago was that it was denouncing the ACHR in order to avoid the 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment resulting from the death row for all those 
persons sentenced to death penalty, since the proceedings before the Inter-American 
organs would have taken too long, what was contrary to its Constitution.58 
Therefore, Trinidad and Tobago became the first country in the region that made 
use of the denunciation clause established in Art. 78 ACHR, which specifically allows 
States to denounce the ACHR. 
Despite that, Trinidad and Tobago could not avoid the ruling of the Court. Pur-
suant to Art. 78(2) ACHR, the denunciation of the ACHR did not release Trinidad and 
Tobago from its obligations therein in relation to all those acts prior the effective date of 
denunciation, as confirmed by the Court in the Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Ben-
jamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago.59 
ii) Peru 
                                               
 
55 Tyagi (2009) pp. 159-160 
56 Ámbito Jurídico (2013) 
57 Cassel (1999) p. 168 
58 Burgorgue-Larsen (2011) p. 14 
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Perhaps, the Fujimori regime encouraged by the example of Trinidad and Toba-
go, became the second experience of withdrawals from the Court’s contentious jurisdic-
tion. Notwithstanding the absence of a denunciation clause for the Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction, Peru, during the course of the cases Ivcher Bronstein and Constitutional 
Court, notified to the Secretary General of the OAS, its decision to withdraw its recog-
nition of the Court’s jurisdiction. The withdrawal was backed by its National Congress, 
and was adopted with “[immediate effects] to all cases in which Peru has not answered 
the application filed with the Court.”60 
The Court relying on its authority to determine the scope of its own compe-
tence61 established that the only denunciation permissible in the ACHR is of the ACHR 
itself as a whole, not of the jurisdiction solely.62 Moreover, the Court also noted the 
absence of any provision in the specific Instrument of Acceptance of Peru allowing for 
the future withdrawal of the Court’s jurisdiction.63 Additionally, the Court emphasized, 
that the duty to comply with the provisions of a treaty is not limited to substantive pro-
visions but also procedural.64 Thus, Article 62(1) ACHR shall be interpreted and ap-
plied in a way that the judicial mechanism for the protection of human rights therein is 
truly practical and effective.65 
For the abovementioned reasons, the Court found the withdrawal attempted by 
Peru inadmissible.66 Fortunately, the Peruvian rebellion was temporal. When the Fu-
jimori regime ended, the interim Government of President Paniagua declared the with-
drawal without effects. Thus, the Peruvian attempted withdrawal turned out to become a 
false retreat.67 
iii) Venezuela 
In August 2008, the Court released its judgment in the Case of Apitz Barbera et 
al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela related to the removal from 
                                               
 
60 IACtHR, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, Competence (1999) para. 27 
61 Idem, para. 31 
62 Idem, para. 50 
63 Idem, para. 38 
64 Idem, para. 36 
65 Idem, para. 36 
66 Idem, para. 53 
67 Burgorgue-Larsen (2011) p. 16 
 19 
office of former judges of the First Court of Administrative Disputes. The Court de-
clared that the procedure before their removal violated their rights to a hearing before 
an impartial tribunal,68 to due guarantees,69 and ordered the Venezuelan State to rein-
state the victims in a position in the Judiciary with same salaries, benefits, and equiva-
lent rank.70 The judgment was strongly opposed by the Venezuelan Government and as 
response, it filed a constitutional procedure against the concerning Inter-American 
judgment before its Supreme Court, in order to declare the judgment contrary to its 
Constitution and consequently of impossible implementation.71 The Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court found the judgment in contravention to the Venezuelan 
Constitution, and concluded that the judgments from the Court are not legally binding 
and inapplicable when they violate the Venezuelan Constitution.72 As if it was not 
enough, the Constitutional Chamber requested the Executive Power of Venezuela to 
denounce the ACHR, what was made official in 2012, and became effective in 2013. In 
that form, Venezuela is the last withdrawal from the ACHR and the Court’s jurisdiction 
in the Inter-American system of human rights, unless the Dominican Republic opts for 
the same route. 
2.4 Final remarks on the context of the Dominican withdrawal 
It might be that the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal followed the unfortunate devel-
opments of the abovementioned Latin-American States. We still do not know what 
steps the Dominican Government will take in the near future with respect to their con-
tinuation under the Court’s jurisdiction. From the previous experiences, the Dominican 
situation may be just a false retreat like Peru, or perhaps, the Constitutional judgment is 
the precursor of a future denunciation like Venezuela. What it is important to note here 
is that despite the Dominican arguments on Constitutional Supremacy, Division of 
Powers, and Legality put forward in its Constitutional judgment, the historical context 
of the Haitian question and the judgments from the Court in that respect cannot be 
simply concealed. The Latin-American precedents demonstrate that decisions like that 
                                               
 
68 IACtHR, Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Prelim-
inary objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs (2008) paras. 67 and 148 
69 Idem, para. 91 
70 Idem, para. 267(17) 
71 Salgado Ledesma (2012) p. 243 
72 Ibidem 
 20 
of the Dominican Republic, generally follow inconvenient judgments and decisions 
from the Inter-American human rights organs. And, the declarations of the Dominican 
Foreign Minister and the dissenting opinion of Judge Jiménez Martínez seem to place 
the Dominican situation in a similar rhetoric. Regardless whether the Dominican State 
opts to remain under the Court’s jurisdiction or to withdraw, the harm is done. From the 
thirty-five members of the OAS,73 ten have never ratified the ACHR; three of those, 
which have ratified the ACHR, have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court yet; two, 
which ratified ACHR and recognized the Court’s jurisdiction, have already withdrawn 
with no clear signals of a soon return; and other governments threaten with withdrawing 
from the system. Thus, I believe that the current Dominican situation constitutes a new 
setback for the consolidation of the Inter-American human rights system and the uni-
versality of human rights. In response to that, I will proceed to the legal evaluation of 
the Constitutional judgment in Chapter 3. 
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3 Analysis of the compliance of the Dominican withdrawal 
with international, Inter-American, and Dominican law 
3.1 The requirements of the recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
I will address in the present Sub-Chapter the first assumption of my hypothesis: 
Neither the ACHR nor domestic law establish the requirement of ratification for the recognition 
of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction to be valid and produce legal effects. The ACHR does not 
lay down any specific requirement, besides the act of notification of accession at any moment by 
the Parties to the ACHR. Thus, I argue that the sole signature of the Dominican President at the 
time, and the notification to the OAS are sufficient for the Recognition of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion to bind the Dominican State under the ACHR. 
3.1.1 The recognition of the contentious jurisdiction under the American 
Convention on Human Rights 
Similar to other international tribunals,74 the Court lacks contentious jurisdiction ipso 
iure as it is endowed for its advisory jurisdiction.75 There is no obligation upon states to 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction. As Article 62(1) ACHR clearly lays down, “[a] State 
Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to th[e ACHR], or 
at any subsequent time, declare it recognizes […] the jurisdiction of the Court.” Conse-
quently, it is not considered that the sole ratification of the ACHR implies simultane-
ously the acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction.76 Therefore, the acceptance 
of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction constitutes a sine qua non prerequisite for the 
exercise thereof. As the Court has expressly stated, “[i]t would make no sense […] to 
examine the merits of the case without first establishing whether the parties involved 
have accepted the Court's jurisdiction.”77 
Now the question is how the recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction 
shall be made by States in order to produce the intended legal effects. To that end, I will 
first look at the ACHR and then at the domestic law of the Dominican Republic. 
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Article 62 is the only provision of the ACHR that regulates the recognition of 
the contentious jurisdiction. Its first paragraph establishes that States may make a decla-
ration recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction i) at the moment of the ratification or adher-
ence to the ACHR, ii) at any subsequent time, or iii) simply not accept the Court’s con-
tentious jurisdiction. Moreover, the same provision stipulates that the recognition of 
jurisdiction may be unconditional, ipso facto, and without requiring special agreement, 
or conditional.78 Under the conditional form, States are allowed to limit the Court’s ju-
risdiction for specific cases (ratione materiae), for a specified period (ratione temporis), 
or simply recognize it on the basis of reciprocity (in the case of inter-states applica-
tions).79 
Furthermore, Article 62(3) ACHR establishes that the Court’s contentious juris-
diction may be recognized whether by special declaration or by special agreement. The 
former is the declaration referred in the previous paragraphs, which although can be 
subject to certain limitations, in general terms all persons and all sort of violations of 
rights protected by the ACHR (and other regional human rights treaties ratified by the 
respondent State) may be referred to the Court. Whereas the latter constitutes a specific 
case in which a State, that has not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction yet, may accept it 
for that specific case, without obligating that State to accept the Court’s jurisdiction for 
any other case.  
Besides Article 62 ACHR, there are no more provisions on the form in which 
the recognition the Court’s jurisdiction should be done in order to produce legal effects. 
Therefore, there is no specific mention on whether the act of recognition requires par-
liamentary ratification. 
Turning to the Dominican case, the recognition of Court’s jurisdiction was made 
through a declaration formulated by its President on 19 February 1999, approximately 
after 20 years from the Dominican ratification of the ACHR. The Declaration does not 
contain any reference to the permissible limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction referred 
above, neither does it estipulate any other restriction. 
                                               
 
78 ACHR Article 62 
79 ACHR Article 62(2) 
 23 
As I have referred previously, the Constitutional Tribunal found that the Instru-
ment of Acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is unconstitutional because it was not 
approved by the National Congress. Thus, the question is whether that approval is nec-
essary according to the ACHR. 
First, an act of recognition in the form of a declaration formulated by a State 
recognizing the contentious jurisdiction of the Court falls under the classification of 
unilateral acts. That has been recognized by the IACtHR,80 and the Dominican Consti-
tutional Tribunal itself.81 Similarly, the ICJ has also established it with regard to the 
declarations formulated by States pursuant to the equivalent Article 36 ICJ Statute.82 
Second, it is important to establish that there is a general understanding that uni-
lateral acts constitute a source of international obligations for States.83 As Cassese re-
fers, although unilateral acts are not provided for in Article 38 ICJ Statute, it is envis-
aged that they have the same rank as those provided for custom and treaties.84 The ICJ 
established in the landmark Nuclear Tests cases that 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual 
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, 
and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it 
should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the charac-
ter of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of con-
duct consistent with the declaration […].85 
Third, the Constitutional Tribunal went even further in its definition of the In-
strument of Recognition and explained that it constitutes a non-autonomous unilateral 
act, and added, that given its (dependent) nature, the analysis of the concerning Instru-
ment of Recognition must be done only within the framework of the ACHR.86 This 
view coincides with the established by the Court in the Case of the Constitutional 
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Court, in which it distinguished the acceptance of jurisdiction, a unilateral act carried 
out within the framework of treaty law, from other unilateral acts carried out purely in 
the context of interstate relations, such as recognition, promise, protest, or renuncia-
tion.87 
Thus, if the Recognition of Jurisdiction is a non-autonomous unilateral act de-
pendent on and regulated by the ACHR, it should fall within the law of treaties88 and 
the provisions of the ACHR itself. Similarly, the Court has established that the “ac-
ceptance [of jurisdiction] is determined and shaped by the [ACHR] itself and, in partic-
ular, through fulfillment of its object and purpose.”89 
Therefore, by looking at the ACHR, it is clear that Article 62 does not impose 
upon States any formality such as legislative approval/ratification for the recognition of 
its jurisdiction to produce legal effects, besides the formulation of a declaration. How-
ever, that requirement cannot be constructed from the omission of Article 62 ACHR, 
because if States wanted to establish that formality, they would have established it. For 
instance, Article 74(1) ACHR lays down that the “[ACHR] shall be open for signature 
and ratification by or adherence [Emphasis added].” Hence, the absence of a ratifica-
tion requirement for the Instrument of Recognition was consensual, otherwise it would 
had been included in Article 62 ACHR. 
Additionally, when the Legislature of the Dominican Republic ratified the 
ACHR in 1978, it did so without reservations or interpretative declarations, including 
for Article 62 ACHR. Similarly, the Dominican delegation did not make an observation 
or commentary, during the travaux préparatoires for the adoption of the ACHR, with 
regard to the necessity of more formalities for the recognition of jurisdiction to produce 
legal effects.90 For those reasons, I consider that if the Dominican Republic wanted to 
have the Recognition of the Court’s Jurisdiction adopted through a different procedure 
from that established in the ACHR, it had several opportunities for expressing such a 
position, but it chose not do so. 
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In sum, the Recognition of the Court’s Jurisdiction is a unilateral act regulated 
primarily by the ACHR. The ACHR does not require the Recognition of the Court’s 
Jurisdiction to be ratified or approved by States’ legislatures in order to produce legal 
effects. Consequently, the Instrument of Acceptance effectively binds the Dominican 
Republic to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction in spite of the lack of legislative ap-
proval. 
3.1.2 The recognition of the contentious jurisdiction under Dominican Law 
While the validity of the Recognition of Jurisdiction is regulated by the ACHR and trea-
ty law, not domestic law, I consider that an analysis of the Constitutional provisions in 
which the Dominican Constitutional based its decision cannot be evaded. As the former 
Inter-American Judge, Sergio García Ramírez, stated when he was discussing the 
Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction made by Mexico, “the intention was formalized 
through the proposal submitted by the Executive to the Senate, […] in an act that might 
be legally indispensable, or might not.”91 I will explore in this section the first possibil-
ity referred by Judge García Ramírez, whether an act of ratification was necessary un-
der domestic law. 
In the last two decades, the Dominican Republic has adopted three National 
Constitutions,92 one in 1994, one in 2002, and the one currently in force in 2010. The 
Constitutional Tribunal based its analysis on the 2002 Constitution, the one in force 
when the Constitutional Review procedure was lodged, and on the 2010 Constitution, 
the one in force when the Constitutional Tribunal released its judgment. An interesting 
question which was not raised by the Constitutional Tribunal is why it did not consider 
in its judgment the 1994 Dominican Constitution, which was the one in force in 1999 
when the Instrument of Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction was signed and notified 
to the OAS. In the light of the above, I will base my search not only on the 2002 and 
2010 Constitutions as the Constitutional Tribunal did, but also on the 1994 Constitution, 
which is the one that governed the powers of the President and the Legislature at the 
time the act was done. 
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There is no provision on the 1994 Constitution, the 2002 Constitution, or the 
2010 Constitution, that establishes the obligation of the President of the Republic, or the 
faculty of the National Congress, to have unilateral acts carried out by the former ap-
proved by the latter. Indeed, the only two provisions that specifically refer to the adop-
tion of international obligations are Articles 55(6) and 37(14) of the 1994 Constitution, 
Articles 55(6) and 37(14) of the 2002 Constitution, and Articles 128(1)(d) and 93(1)(l) 
of the 2010 Constitution. The provisions of the three constitutions set forth in almost 
identical terms the attribution of the President to “[c]elebrate and sign treaties or inter-
national conventions and submit them to the approval of the National Congress”93 and 
the attribution of the National Congress to “approve or disapprove the international 
treaties and conventions subscribed by the Executive Power.”94 Clearly, there is no ref-
erence to other sources of international obligations besides treaties or conventions, thus 
in stricto sensu there is no obligation for the Executive or attribution of the Legislative 
to have the Instrument of Recognition (a unilateral act) approved by the Congress.  
Based on the analysis of the provisions of the three Dominican constitutions that 
have existed since 1999, I consider that it is not possible to deduce the requirement of 
legislative approval for unilateral acts. As the dissenter Judge Bonilla Hernández in the 
Constitutional judgment referred, the recognition is not a treaty or convention that re-
quires ratification.95 Therefore, I conclude that neither under the ACHR nor under Do-
minican Law, the Dominican Instrument of Recognition fails to comply with the formal 
requirements necessary to produce legal effects and bind the Dominican Republic to the 
Court’s authority. 
3.2 The special hierarchy of the obligations under the American 
Convention on Human Rights 
In the present Sub-Chapter I will address the second assumption of my hypothesis: 
International law, Inter-American law, and Dominican law recognize the special hierarchy of in-
ternational obligations, particularly fundamental international human rights obligations such as 
those arising from the ACHR. For that reason, the obligations derived from the Instrument of 
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Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, an act regulated by international law and the ACHR, 
must prevail over domestic law, even in case of conflict with the Dominican Constitution. 
3.2.1 The relationship between international law and domestic law 
The relationship between international obligations adopted by States and their domestic 
legal provisions may give rise to conflict of norms. When it happens, the principle pac-
ta sunt servanda may prevent States from “invok[ing] provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”96 In the same way, although pacta sunt 
servanda is concerned with treaty obligations, it has been recognized that a similar rule 
applies for other sources of international obligations.97 Similarly, the ICJ has been con-
clusive on the question by recognizing “the fundamental principle of international law 
that international law prevails over domestic law.”98 
Additionally, the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts, which have acquired increasingly authority as customary law,99 set out 
in Article 12 that “[t]here is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an 
act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, re-
gardless of its origin or character.” Particularly, it is important to pay special attention 
to the phrase regardless of its origin or character since it extends the responsibility of 
States to other sources of international law, including unilateral acts. Therefore, even in 
the event that domestic tribunal decides to invalidate an international treaty (or any oth-
er source of international obligations) because it conflicts with its domestic law, the 
failure to perform the obligation would nevertheless constitute a breach of international 
law.100  
On its part, the IACtHR has held that “all obligations imposed by [international 
law] must be fulfilled in good faith; domestic law may not be invoked to justify nonful-
fillment[, what] may be deemed to be general principles of law.”101 Similarly, it has 
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stated that “a customary law prescribes that a State that has concluded an international 
agreement must introduce into its domestic laws whatever changes are needed to ensure 
execution of the obligations it has undertaken.”102 
Therefore, it can be affirmed that international obligations should be given pri-
macy in case of conflict with domestic laws. This would be even more applicable for 
international human rights obligations given their prominent role over other norms of 
international law.103 That is particularly true for those jus cogens norms, erga omnes 
obligations,104 and non-derogable rights.105 
Back to the particular Dominican withdrawal, it is clear that the first conse-
quence of it would be the non-recognition of the IACtHR’s judgments by the Domini-
can State. By doing so the Dominican Republic would fail to comply not only with the 
judgments, but also with its human rights obligations set forth by the ACHR forming 
the subject matter of those cases. Additionally, the Dominican Republic would fail to 
comply with its undertakings under the unilateral act of recognition of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Thus, regardless whether the Instrument of Recognition failed to comply 
with domestic legal provisions as ruled by the Constitutional Tribunal, the principles 
referred in previous paragraphs should prevent the Dominican Republic from eluding its 
human rights obligations and its compromise to participate in the court system it has 
consented to back in 1999. The opposite, even legitimate under domestic law, would 
constitute a breach of international law. 
3.2.2 The hierarchy of the American Convention on Human Rights 
Brewer-Carías argues that currently the process of protection of human rights is in its 
third stage, what he defines as the “Constitutionalization of the Internationalization of 
Human Rights.”106 During this stage international human rights are constitutionalized 
through the incorporation of the international and regional systems of protection of hu-
man rights within the domestic regulations of States.107 In Latin-America, normally this 
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incorporation of international human rights norms into the domestic legal systems is 
addressed directly in their national constitutions.108 In this form, it is possible to affirm 
that in Latin-American the monist109 and dualist110 debate has been solved in the region 
in favor of the former theory. Thus, when a Latin-American State adopts an internation-
al treaty, it produces immediate legal effects in its national law. Consequently, once a 
State ratifies or adheres to the ACHR, it is automatically incorporated into its domestic 
law.111 The question is, in which rank is the ACHR incorporated with respect to nation-
al constitutions and secondary norms? 
In general, it is possible to affirm that there are four historical groups in which 
Latin-American constitutions can be classified with respect to the status they recognize 
to international human rights treaties.112 The first group of constitutions recognizes that 
human rights conventions have a higher status than domestic law (including national 
constitutions). We can find in this group the Constitution of Guatemala.113 In the second 
category, we find constitutions that recognize human rights treaties the same status of 
that of constitutional provisions. For example, the Constitution of Argentina expressly 
recognizes constitutional status to a list of human rights treaties, the ACHR included.114 
The third group of constitutions gives international treaties a higher hierarchy than laws, 
but lower than the national constitution. In this third group we can find the Constitution 
of Costa Rica.115 Finally, the last group of constitutions places human rights treaties at 
the same level of national laws. Arguably, this fourth group is now empty, since the 
Constitution of Mexico, which used to be the last constitution in this group, after its 
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constitutional reform of 2011 grants human rights treaties constitutional status,116 plac-
ing Mexico among the second group referred above. 
However, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR shows that in its view, the ACHR is 
seen as having a higher position with respect to domestic law, including national consti-
tutions. An example of that is the development of the principle of Conventionality Con-
trol introduced for the first time by the Court in the judgment in the Case of Almonacid-
Arellano et al v. Chile of 2006. According to the Court, this principle implies that 
“when a State has ratified [the ACHR], its judges, as part of the State, are also bound by 
such Convention. This forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied 
in the [ACHR] are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contra-
ry to its purpose.”117 Therefore, the supervision of the compliance with the ACHR is no 
longer only the duty of the Court (known as the concentrated conventionality control), 
but it is also duty of national judges to ensure its national implementation (known as 
diffuse conventionality control).118 To perform this diffuse conventionality control, the 
national “Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpreta-
tion thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the 
[ACHR].”119 Thus, the principle of Conventionality Control entails that the provisions 
of the ACHR should be given priority over provisions of domestic law, imposing on 
States the obligation to adapt its domestic law to conform with the Inter-American hu-
man rights framework. Actually, this obligation to adopt domestic law it not new at all 
in the Inter-American system, since it has always existed under Article 2 ACHR regard-
ing domestic implementation. 
Similarly, we can quote relevant opinions of Inter-American judges in support 
of the special rank of the ACHR over domestic legislation. Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor 
Poisot has stated that if constitutional guarantees fail to protect fundamental rights, 
these judicial guarantees are transferred to the ACHR, what “gives rise to a ‘conven-
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tional supremacy’.”120 The former Inter-American and current ICJ Judge Cançado Trin-
dade has said that the “[ACHR], besides other human rights treaties, were conceived 
and adopted on the basis of the assumption that the domestic legal orders ought to be 
harmonized with the conventional provisions, and not vice versa.”121 In fact, the Court 
in its recent judgment in the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians has confirmed 
these opinions. In this case, the Court ordered the Dominican Republic to “adopt, within 
a reasonable time, the necessary measures to annul any type of norm, whether adminis-
trative, regulatory, legal or constitutional […] contrary to the [ACHR] [Emphasis add-
ed].”122 The above, confirms the position of the Court that in the event domestic law 
(including constitutional provisions) conflicts with provisions of the ACHR, the latter 
prevails and the former must be adapted in accordance to the ACHR. 
Moreover, apart from the countries referred in the previous Chapter, and proba-
bly now the Dominican Republic, there are examples at the domestic sphere that con-
firms the special hierarchy of the ACHR over domestic law, and the binding force of 
the Court’s judgments. For example, the Mexican Supreme Court has recognized that it 
cannot evaluate the proceedings of the IACtHR, but just comply to the extent and in the 
terms of its judgments, and that the IACtHR’s decisions are binding for all organs of the 
State.123 By the same token, the Constitutional Court of Colombia has established that 
the constitutional rights and duties must be interpreted according to the international 
human rights treaties ratified by Colombia, and that the jurisprudence of those interna-
tional organs responsible for their interpretation constitutes a relevant criterion for the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions on fundamental rights.124 For its part, the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Peru has also stated that the rights and freedoms in the Peru-
vian Constitution must be interpreted in accordance to international human rights trea-
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ties ratified by Peru, and has added that it implicitly entails that the interpretation should 
follow that, in particular, of the IACtHR, the ultimate guardian of rights in the region.125 
I consider that based on the numbers of the national constitutions recognizing 
the special hierarchy of the ACHR, and the support found in the jurisprudence at the 
regional and national level, it is possible to affirm that in Latin-America the elevated 
status of the ACHR over domestic law (including national constitutions) is well-
established. Thus, we cannot expect the ACHR’s provisions to be adapted and subordi-
nated to domestic provisions, which vary from country to country, but only the opposite 
way.126 
3.2.3 The status of the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Dominican Republic 
According to its new National Constitution enacted on 26 January 2010, the Govern-
ment of the Dominican Republic is divided into three independent powers: Legislative, 
Executive, and Judiciary.127 The Legislature resides in the National Congress, which 
consists in two bodies, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The National Congress 
has the power, among others, to adopt national laws and approve the international trea-
ties signed by the President.128 The President is the Head of the Executive Power and 
the Head of the State and has the power, among others, to conduct the international and 
domestic policy, to appoint the members of the Cabinet of Ministers, and to enter into 
international treaties.129 The Judiciary is formed by the Supreme Court of Justice and 
the tribunals adopted by the Constitution and laws.130 Perhaps, the most fundamental 
structural change of the 2010 Constitution is the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
It is defined by the Act 137-11 as the supreme organ for the interpretation and control 
of the constitutionality, and it was endowed with independence from the other powers 
of the Dominican State.131 The Constitutional Tribunal has competence to decide on the 
constitutionality of laws, decrees, and resolutions (international treaties are not 
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listed),132 and to exercise the preventive control of international treaties before their 
ratification by the Legislative.133 Notably, according to the Constitution in force, the 
Constitutional Tribunal is not expressly authorized to review the constitutionality of 
International Treaties after ratification, but only before ratification. 
With regard to the hierarchy of international obligations, Article 26 of the 2010 
Constitution recognizes that the Dominican State is observant of the norms of interna-
tional law. Consequently, the Dominican Republic recognizes and applies the norms of 
international law,134 and that the ratified international conventions will govern within 
the domestic sphere.135 In particular, the 2010 Constitution recognizes specifically that 
human rights treaties have constitutional rank. 
Article 74(3).- The treaties, pacts and conventions concerning human rights, subscribed and rati-
fied by the Dominican State, have constitutional hierarchy and are of direct and immediate ap-
plication by the tribunals and other organs of the State. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Dominican Republic has recog-
nized the binding character, not only of the ACHR but also of the interpretation thereof 
done by the Court, for all the Dominican State, including its Judiciary.136 
In the light of the above, it seems clear that the Dominican Republic incorpo-
rates international law automatically into its legal system. Moreover, although the 2010 
Constitution does not recognize the supremacy of all branches of international law over 
constitutional provisions, it does recognize constitutional rank to human rights treaties. 
Consequently, the ACHR and other regional and universal human rights conventions 
should be regarded as having the same hierarchy of the National Constitution. This im-
plies that human rights treaties have been recognized by 2010 Constitution as part of the 
Block of Constitutionality. Thus, when the Constitutional Tribunal and other organs of 
the Dominican Judiciary review the compliance of acts with the Dominican Constitu-
tion, the international human rights treaties shall be regarded as part of a single body of 
norms together with the Constitution. Thus, a violation of an international human rights 
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obligation in force in the Dominican Republic amounts to a violation of its own Consti-
tution. This is expressly confirmed by Articles 6137 and 7(10)138 of the Act 137-11 
which regulates the Constitutional Procedures and the Constitutional Tribunal. 
This constitutional hierarchy of human rights treaties is particularly relevant be-
cause it raises serious questions with respect to the Constitutional judgment. On the one 
hand, it is questionable whether the provisions of the National Constitution can invali-
date the Instrument of Recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction because it is primarily 
regulated by the ACHR, a norm (from the domestic legal perspective) of the same rank. 
On the other hand, since the ACHR and the Dominican Constitution are norms of the 
same rank, the ACHR would be the lex specialis with regard to the Recognition of Ju-
risdiction of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, given that there is no specific provi-
sion regulating unilateral acts in the Constitution, whereas the ACHR does regulate the 
act of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the Constitutional Tribunal itself 
recognized that the analysis of the Instrument of Recognition, as a non-autonomous 
unilateral act, should be done only based on the provisions of the ACHR.139 Hence, it 
seems to me that the Constitutional Tribunal fell in a contraction when it recognized the 
lex specialis status of the ACHR with respect to the recognition of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, but assessed its legality under the provisions of the Constitution. 
Based on the analysis above, we can make four related claims with respect to the 
Dominican legal framework and the unconstitutionality of the Instrument of Recogni-
tion declared by the Constitutional Tribunal. First, that it is beyond doubt that the Do-
minican Constitution recognizes constitutional rank to the ACHR. Second, that the Do-
minican constitution does not establish any requirement whatsoever for unilateral acts 
to be valid, on the contrary, it only sets forth formal requirements for international trea-
ties and conventions. Third, that the only mechanism for the Constitutional Control of 
international obligations of the Dominican State recognized for the Constitutional Tri-
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bunal by the Constitution is the so-called preventive control of international treaties 
prior to ratification (not after). And four, that the Constitutional Review as delimited by 
Article 185(1) of the 2010 Constitution, does not authorize the Constitutional Tribunal 
to review the constitutionality of international obligations of the Dominican State after 
their adoption. For these reasons, I consider that the judgment of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal declaring the unconstitutionality of the Instrument of Recognition of the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction contradicts, or at least, goes beyond the existing Constitutional 
framework of the Dominican Republic. 
3.3 The Dominican withdrawal under provisions and principles of 
international and Inter-American law 
I will address in the present Sub-Chapter the third assumption of my hypothesis: 
The eventual withdrawal of the Dominican Republic from the Court’s contentious jurisdiction 
would contravene a series of principles and rules of public international law and of the Inter-
American human rights system. Among these principles, I will address the power of the IACtHR 
to decide on its own jurisdiction (compétence de la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz); the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith, and the rules for the invalidity of treaties; and 
principles related to State’s conduct, consent and acquiescence. 
3.3.1 The power of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to decide on its 
own jurisdiction 
Neither the ACHR nor the Statute of the IACtHR have a specific provision establishing 
the competence of the Court to decide questions regarding its own jurisdiction,140 as the 
ICJ Statute and the European Convention on Human Rights do.141 However, it is im-
plicit in Article 62(3) ACHR which lays down that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall 
comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this 
Convention”. As Úbeda de Torres affirms, the power to decide on its jurisdiction “is 
inherent to all Courts and they cannot refuse to exercise it.”142 For this power to be ef-
fective it should extend to the interpretation of the instruments of recognition of their 
jurisdiction. As the ICJ has established, “the right [of an international tribunal] to decide 
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as to its own jurisdiction and […] the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments 
which govern that jurisdiction [is] a rule consistently accepted by general international 
law.”143  
For its part, the IACtHR has expressly stated “it is master of its own jurisdic-
tion”,144 and that “as any organ with jurisdictional functions, it has the power inherent 
in its attributes to determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la compé-
tence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz).”145 Furthermore, it has also stated that “[t]he instruments 
accepting the optional clause on the binding jurisdiction (Article 62(1) of the Conven-
tion) presuppose the acceptance by the States presenting them of the Court’s right to 
decide any dispute relating to its jurisdiction.”146 Then, following the same reasoning of 
the ICJ, the IACtHR has also confirmed its power to decide on its own jurisdiction and 
on the evaluation of the declarations regulated by Article 62 ACHR. 
Back to the Dominican case, even when the Constitutional Tribunal was not 
judging per se the jurisdiction of the Court, but the constitutionality of the Instrument of 
Recognition, the ruling has a direct impact on the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court. 
This is because it would de facto deprive the Court from the opportunity to decide on its 
own jurisdiction. Thus, the Constitutional Tribunal is (indirectly) judging the jurisdic-
tion of the Court to try the Dominican Republic, in a clear invasion of the Court’s au-
thority under the principle compétence de la compétence. 
In fact, from the perspective of the Inter-American legal framework, the consti-
tutionality or not of the Instrument of Recognition is an external aspect that shall not 
interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court. In the words of the Court, “the jurisdiction 
of the [Court] cannot be contingent upon events extraneous to its own actions.”147 Al-
lowing the opposite, would be contrary to the purpose and object of the ACHR of estab-
lishing a mechanism for the protection of human rights. As Judge Cançado Trindade 
has stated, “the Court, and not the State, has the last say on its jurisdiction, the opposite 
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would lead to the subversion of the international legal order and to the destruction of all 
legal certainty in international dispute resolution.”148 
Therefore, the Dominican withdrawal from the Court based on the judgment of 
its Constitutional Tribunal would deprive the Court from its power to decide on every 
question regarding its own jurisdiction under the well-established principle compétence 
de la compétence and Article 62(3) ACHR. 
3.3.2 Provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties: Pacta 
sunt servanda, invalidity of treaties, and good faith149 
Despite the fact that the act subject to the Constitutional Review is the Instrument of 
Recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, a unilateral act, the Constitu-
tional Tribunal applied principles of the law of the treaties for the analysis of the In-
strument of Recognition. In its analysis, the Tribunal referred to the principle pacta sunt 
servanda and the rules for the invalidity of treaties established in Articles 26, 27, and 46 
VCLT. The conclusion of the Constitutional Tribunal was that “the prohibition to in-
voke Domestic Law in order to fail to comply with State obligations under international 
conventions has an exemption.”150 This exemption arises when “the consent of a State 
to participate in a treaty has not been given [in accordance to the law] or is void of legal 
effects due to its conflict with a norm of domestic law of fundamental importance.”151 
Therefore, “the rule Pacta sunt servanda [is ineffective] when the consent of the State 
to participate in a treaty has not been produced [in accordance with the law] or is 
null.”152 What in the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal applies (analogically) with 
respect to the Instrument of Recognition signed by the President of the Dominican Re-
public without legislative approval, “because the Dominican consent to the contentious 
jurisdiction of the IACtHR [was] given under a manifest breach of a fundamental norm 
of the domestic law of the Dominican State.”153 
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In response, the Commission through a press release of November 2014 stated 
that “the reference to Article 46 VCLT [on the invalidity of treaties] by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal is openly incompatible with the law of the treaties.”154 
I will consider first whether it is correct to apply principles of the law of treaties 
to unilateral acts like the recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. On that 
subject, the ICJ has established that “[i]t appears from the requirements of good faith 
that [declarations] should be treated, by analogy, according to the law of treaties.”155 
Therefore, I will proceed to the analysis of the compliance of those principles in the 
judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The Preamble of the VCLT lays down that the principles of pacta sunt servanda 
and good faith are universally recognized. Pursuant to Article 26 VCLT, the principle 
pacta sunt servanda entails that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith.”156 The same principle imposes that “[a] 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty,”157 except when the “consent [of the State] to be bound by a treaty has 
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to 
conclude treaties.”158 However, that violation of domestic law must be “manifest” and 
must concern a rule of “fundamental importance.”159 In addition, “[a] violation is mani-
fest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in ac-
cordance with normal practice and in good faith.”160 
Therefore, we can deduce from Article 46 VCLT two pre-requisites: i) the pro-
vision breached must be of fundamental importance regarding the competence to con-
clude treaties, and ii) that the violation must be manifest (objectively evident) under 
normal practices and good faith. 
i) A provision of fundamental importance 
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As the Constitutional Tribunal concluded, the power of the organs of the Do-
minican Republic to adopt treaties is a norm of fundamental character. This has been 
recognized by the ICJ which has stated that “[t]he rules concerning the authority to sign 
treaties for a State are constitutional rules of fundamental importance.”161 In fact, the 
legislative approval of international treaties is an increasingly common precondition for 
the internal applicability thereof among States.162 However, we must bear in mind that 
the Recognition of Jurisdiction is not a treaty but a unilateral act. Thus, the requisite of 
legislative approval cannot be automatically imposed for the Instrument of Recognition 
just because it is required for treaties. Moreover, as analyzed before, none of the Do-
minican constitutions that have been in force during the period the Dominican Republic 
has been under the contentious jurisdiction of the Court (1999-2014?) sets forth the req-
uisite of legislative approval for unilateral acts. 
Under this legal framework, it seems highly doubtful whether the controverted 
Instrument of Recognition has breached a norm of fundamental character of the Domin-
ican Law or International Law. Therefore, it is questionable whether the first requisite 
established in Article 46(1) VCLT was fulfilled in the Dominican case. 
ii) The breach must be manifest or objectively evident under normal practices 
and good faith 
For a State to legitimately fail to comply with its international obligations based 
on its domestic law, the breach must had been “ascertainable and a matter of common 
knowledge.”163 In the Dominican case, it can hardly be considered that the breach of the 
Dominican Constitution by the Instrument of Recognition is or was noticeable by all the 
parties that have relied on the Dominican recognition. On the one hand, because as I 
have said, no provision of domestic law establishes the requirement of legislative ap-
proval for unilateral acts. On the other hand, because it is presumed that a unilateral 
declaration done by a Head of State, as the Dominican President, is sufficient to bind a 
State and produce legal effects. This is supported by Paragraph 4 of the ILC’s Guiding 
Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obliga-
                                               
 
161 ICJ, Case Concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment 
(2002), para. 265 
162 Shelton (2011) p. 8 
163 Villiger (2009) p. 590 
 40 
tions, which lays down that “[a] unilateral declaration binds the State internationally 
only if it is made by an authority vested with the power to do so. By virtue of their func-
tions, heads of State, heads of Government and ministers for foreign affairs are compe-
tent to formulate such declarations”, what resembles Article 7 VCLT regarding the rep-
resentatives of States with the power to adopt a treaty on their behalf. In that respect, 
the ICJ has stated that  
[A] limitation of a Head of State’s capacity [with respect to the authority to sign treaties] is not 
manifest in the sense of Article 46, paragraph 2, unless at least properly publicized. This is par-
ticularly so because Heads of State belong to the group of persons [listed in] Article 7, paragraph 
2 [VCLT].164 
Therefore, the alleged requisite of legislative approval for the Instrument of 
Recognition signed by the Head of State of the Dominican Republic cannot be consid-
ered to be objectively evident for all other parties. 
Additionally, I consider that even if the Instrument of Recognition was in con-
flict with fundamental norms of Dominican law, the Dominican Republic waived its 
right to be legally exempt from its duty to comply with the obligations derived from it, 
because a treaty given in violation of Article 46 VCLT is not void ab initio but voida-
ble.165 It means that a State that discovers constitutional difficulties, instead of resorting 
to a claim of invalidity, it should promptly notify the other parties and seek to obtain a 
revision of its own internal legislation, or even an amendment to the treaty.166 However, 
the Dominican Republic has never notified those constitutional difficulties to neither the 
OAS nor the Inter-American human rights organs. On the contrary, the Dominican Re-
public participated and consented the Court’s jurisdiction. Particularly, since 2003 when 
the Dominican Republic appeared for the first time before the Court in a contentious 
case.  
Moreover, even in the case that the requirements under Articles 27 and 46 
VCLT were fulfilled for the invalidity of the act of recognition of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, that is, that the Instrument of Recognition manifestly violated a fundamental norm 
                                               
 
164 ICJ, Case Concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment 
(2002), para. 265 
165 Villiger (2009) p. 590 
166 Ibidem 
 41 
of Dominican law, it would not invalidate all the acts performed in good faith based on 
that recognition. In that respect, Article 69(2) VCLT (omitted by the Constitutional Tri-
bunal) clearly sets out that the “acts performed in good faith before the invalidity was 
invoked are not rendered unlawful by reason only of the invalidity of the treaty.” This 
means that when a treaty is invalid, that does not make the acts performed in god faith 
null or unlawful. Thus, mutatis mutandi, the invalidity of the Instrument of Recognition 
does not render invalid the proceedings done in reliance of the Dominican recognition 
of jurisdiction. 
Therefore, I consider that the possible invalidity of the Instrument of Recogni-
tion would not exclude the Dominican Republic from its obligation to comply with the 
judgments from the Court concluded in good faith, at least those released before the 
declaration of invalidity (the Constitutional judgment). Otherwise, it would be detri-
mental for all those who relied in good faith on the validity of the Instrument of Recog-
nition. For instance, not recognizing the binding force of the judgments from the Court, 
valid or not, would directly affect the victims in those cases who acted in good faith 
before an international instance in order to find relief for violations of human rights. In 
fact, I consider that the non-recognition of the cases would also affect all the other ac-
tors in those cases: the Commission, the representatives of the victims, among others. In 
other words, I consider that the alleged invalidity of the Instrument of Recognition does 
not exempt the Dominican Republic from complying with the judgment in the Case of 
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians. 
For all the above, I consider that the lack of legislative approval in the Domini-
can Instrument of Recognition of the IACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction cannot violate a 
nonexistent fundamental norm of Dominican law. Even if there was such a norm, it 
would be difficult to hold that the breach was manifest for all parties. For that reason, I 
agree with the Commission on its statement that the application of the rules of invalidity 
of treaties by the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal seems to be incompatible with the 
law of the treaties. Moreover, even if the Instrument of Recognition were truly in viola-
tion of fundamental norms of the Dominican law, at this moment, the failure to comply 
with the Court’s judgments would be contrary to the principle of good faith, because it 
would unfairly affect all the parties in those cases who have relied in the State’s behav-
ior until now. 
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3.3.3 State’s conduct, consent and acquiescence 
Judge Acosta de los Santos, from the Constitutional Tribunal, stated in its dissenting 
opinion that “besides that the instrument of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction was 
done regularly, the behavior of the powers of the [Dominican] State […] leave no room 
for doubts on the acceptance thereof.”167 In connection to that, the NGO COLACID, 
which intervened in the Constitutional Review as Amicus Curiae, referred that the prin-
ciples of estoppel and forum prorogatum demonstrate that the Dominican Republic has 
recognized as valid and constitutional the Court’s jurisdiction.168 However, the Consti-
tutional Tribunal abstained from pronouncing on both principles because it considered 
they were related to acts out of the scope of the Constitutional Review.169 This position 
notwithstanding, I consider that the approximately 16 years of State’s acquiescence of 
the Court’s jurisdiction may represent an important element to take into account in the 
present Dominican situation. Hence, I will address in the present section the possible 
conflict of the Dominican withdrawal with the principles of estoppel and forum pro-
rogatum. 
i) Acts and conduct of the Dominican Republic consenting to the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
In the present section, I will list the main acts and conduct done by the Dominican Re-
public through which it has consented to the Court’s jurisdiction since the date the In-
strument of Recognition was presented to the OAS in 1999. 
a) Instrument of Recognition 
Indubitably, the first and most important manifestation of the Dominican Repub-
lic recognizing its intention to be bound to the Court’s jurisdiction is the Instrument of 
Recognition signed in 1999 by its President at that time. The act was duly notified to the 
General Assembly of the OAS in compliance of Article 62 ACHR. 
b) Participation in all the previous proceedings before the Court 
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The second form of recognition is the repeated consent of the Court’s conten-
tious jurisdiction by the Dominican State in all the cases in which it has been party be-
fore the Court. In fact, this form of manifestation is twofold. On the one hand, as a tacit 
manifestation, given that the State has never raised the question of the invalidity of the 
Instrument of Acceptance in any case before the Court so far. On the other hand, as an 
explicit manifestation, because the Dominican Republic has expressly recognized the 
Court’s jurisdiction during the course of contentious cases against it. For instance, even 
in the tense Case of Expelled Dominican and Haitian People, the agents of the State 
said that the Dominican Republic accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court on 
25 March 1999.170 
c) Compliance with the Court’s judgments  
By the same token, the Dominican Republic has recognized the jurisdiction of 
the Court by complying with its judgments and participating in the monitoring of the 
compliance conducted by the Court.171 Indeed, in my view, the compliance with the 
Court’s judgments is perhaps the conclusive manifestation of the recognition of the 
binding character of the Court’s jurisdiction; otherwise, the State would simply not 
comply. 
d) Recognition by the Dominican Judiciary 
Another important manifestation of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction are 
the judgments from the Supreme Court172 and the Constitutional Tribunal173 of the Do-
minican Republic in which they have expressly acknowledged the recognition of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
e) Recognition in national laws 
Finally, the National Congress itself acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Court 
through the adoption of the Act No. 137-11 of 15 June 2011 regarding the organization 
of the Constitutional Tribunal and its proceedings (now amended). According to the 
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Preamble of that Act, the execution of the judgments from the IACtHR was one of the 
constitutional proceedings under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal. And, 
despite the fact that the referred Act was suspiciously modified after less than one 
month by a subsequent Act, it does not diminish the fact that the National Congress has 
acknowledged the Court’s binding force through a legislative act. 
Now that I have listed the most relevant acts and conducts of consent of the ju-
risdiction of the Court done by the Dominican Republic, I will move to the analysis of 
the principles of estoppel and forum prorogatum.  
ii) Estoppel: 
Estoppel was imported into international law from civil law and common law sys-
tems.174 Nevertheless, it has had an independent development from its domestic law 
predecessors.175 Today, estoppel is recognized as a principle of internationals law,176 
and its practical purpose is the promotion of the consistency of the acts of States and 
international relations.177 Furthermore, international tribunals have extensively used 
estoppel.178 For instance in inter-state cases before the ICJ,179 but also by human rights 
tribunals as the ECHR180 and the IACtHR. The IACtHR has stated that “once a State 
has adopted a position producing certain legal effects, may not, under the principle of 
estoppel, later assume a position in contradiction to the former one and changing the 
state of affairs upon which the other party relied.”181 
Thus, estoppel in practice constitutes a fundamental procedural rule which gives 
certainty to the course of cases by preventing the parties from changing their position 
and arguments indiscriminately. The IACtHR frequently relies in its jurisprudence on 
estoppel to prevent a State from invoking objections before it, when the objections were 
not previously raised in the proceeding before the Commission, or to prevent a State 
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from objecting the effects of a recognition of responsibility of human rights violations it 
has done before.182 
Although it is difficult to predict the precise actions of the Dominican Republic 
in future proceedings before the Court, it seems likely that the Dominican Government 
will withdraw from the Court’s jurisdiction. Despite that, the Dominican Republic will 
have to face the authority of the Court at least in a few more situations, because the 
Court will call upon the Dominican State for the monitoring of compliance of the Case 
of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians which will take place in late October 2015. In 
case that the Dominican Government opts for not recognizing the jurisdiction of the 
Court, or simply does not attend the monitoring, this would constitute a breach of the 
principle of estoppel. The Dominican Republic under the principle of estoppel would be 
legally prevented from ignoring the binding force of the Court’s authority when it has 
recognized its jurisdiction during the course of all the stages related to that case. There-
fore, under estoppel, the Dominican State cannot simply contradict itself in detriment of 
the victims in those cases, who have carried out in good faith all the stages of the Inter-
American human rights complaint procedure in order to find relief to their violations. 
Finally, I find illustrative to refer the ICJ Case of Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, in which the United States challenged the validity of Nicaragua’s recognition 
of the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction due to formal defects. In that case, the ICJ conclud-
ed that the acquiescence of Nicaragua and the United States over a period of 38 years 
“unequivocally constitute[ed] consent to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
[ICJ]”, and “[a]s a consequence it was recognized by both Parties that any formal defect 
in Nicaragua's ratification […] did not in any way affect the essential validity of Nica-
ragua's consent to the compulsory jurisdiction.”183 Thus, without explicitly referring to 
estoppel, the Nicaragua case constitutes a good example of the applicability of estoppel 
as basis for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.184 This precedent could poten-
tially be applied by the IACtHR in the present situation of the Dominican Republic. In 
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the Dominican withdrawal, similarly to the Nicaragua case, the legal defects of the In-
strument of Recognition could be deemed as compensated by the 16 years of Domini-
can consent. 
On this basis, I consider that the consistent Dominican recognition of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, and from the ICJ case-law, support the argument that the with-
drawal of the Dominican Republic based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the In-
strument of Recognition would contravene the well-established principle of estoppel. 
Particularly, after approximately 16 years during which all the powers of the Dominican 
State have consistently acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Court to try the Dominican 
Republic. 
iii) Forum prorogatum: 
As for estoppel, the Constitutional Tribunal also abstained from analyzing the principle 
of forum prorogatum on the basis that it relates to acts that fall out of the scope of the 
Constitutional Review procedure.185 
To understand forum prorogatum it is necessary to look at the jurisprudence of 
the ICJ, which has developed the principle since the Corfu Channel Case.186 The ICJ 
held that it has competence to entertain a case under this principle when a State, which 
has not recognized the jurisdiction thereof at the time when an application is filed, ac-
cepts such jurisdiction subsequently.187 This opportunity for the State to accept the ju-
risdiction has to be product of a “voluntary and indisputable consent.”188 Such consent 
can be either expressed by an explicit agreement of the parties in the case, through the 
respondent’s conduct before the ICJ, or through the respondent’s conduct in relation to 
the applicant, in such a manner as to have consented the ICJ’s jurisdiction.189 Therefore, 
in its very essence forum prorogatum consists in giving an applicant an opportunity to 
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confront a respondent State before a tribunal when otherwise it would not be possible 
due to the lack of a prior express recognition of jurisdiction by the State.190 
Turning to the Inter-American system, until now the Court has only exercised 
jurisdiction over States that have recognized its jurisdiction, either at the moment of 
ratification or in a subsequent moment through a declaration, but always through a pri-
or, clear, and express manifestation in that respect. Despite that, it seems possible for 
the Court to apply the principle forum prorogatum as basis of its jurisdiction.191 Pursu-
ant to Article 62(3) ACHR the Court has jurisdiction “provided that the States Parties to 
the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction [Emphasis added]”. Thus, it can 
be inferred that the recognition of jurisdiction can be given either before the submission 
of the case, or once the case is already at the Court. It is also important to mention that 
the wording of Article 36 ICJ and 62 ACHR are very similar with regard to the timing, 
form, and permissible limitations to the recognition of the jurisdiction. Therefore, I con-
sider it is possible to apply analogically the position of the ICJ in the case of the IAC-
tHR. That is, taking a more flexible interpretation of the requirements for the Recogni-
tion of Jurisdiction to be valid, as in the opinion of the ICJ, where the consent of juris-
diction by the States does not require to be given in any particular form.192 
Back to the Dominican case, it is unquestionable that from 1999 until the Case 
of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians exist many manifestations of express and tacit 
consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, even if the Instrument of Recognition of the 
Court’s jurisdiction failed to comply with formalities under domestic law, the principle 
forum prorogatum could still be the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, regardless the nul-
lity/invalidity of the Instrument of Recognition. Because, the purpose of forum proroga-
tum is (precisely) that when a tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
application when it receives the complaint, it might still entertain the case if the re-
spondent State realizes actions that consent such jurisdiction.193 Consequently, even if 
the Dominican Republic opts for declaring that the Court has no (or never had) jurisdic-
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tion in the absence of a valid Instrument of Recognition, the Court could still exercise 
jurisdiction, given that the Dominican Republic has consented the jurisdiction through 
several manifestations of consent until now. In other words, under the principle forum 
prorogatum, the jurisdiction of the Court over the Dominican Republic is no longer 
based exclusively on the existence of a valid Instrument of Recognition, but also in all 
the acts of recognition it has done over the past 16 years. Therefore, the Act of Recogni-
tion being one of the many forms of consent given by the Dominican State, its nullity 
would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. This is the reason why the unilateral 
withdrawal of the Dominican Republic solely based on the judgment from the Constitu-
tional Tribunal (even if valid) would not deprive the IACtHR from its power to enter-
tain a case against the Dominican Republic on the basis of the principle forum proroga-
tum. Each act of consent is independent, and the nullity of one of them (Instrument of 
Recognition), does not affect the others. 
Unfortunately, I consider important to bear in mind that, although forum pro-
rogatum has been used in the inter-state cases of the ICJ, it has not been developed in 
the case-law of the regional human rights courts yet. Hence, we still have to see whether 
the IACtHR will introduce forum protogatum in its jurisprudence. 
In sum, I share the opinion that the IACtHR may rely on forum prorogatum as 
basis for its jurisdiction, and that in principle the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal 
of the Dominican Republic if applied by the Dominican Government to evade the 
Court’s jurisdiction would contravene the principle of forum prorogatum. However, at 
the present state of affairs, I doubt whether this principle is recognized in the Inter-
American system, and consequently whether it has the potential to be applied for the 
Dominican situation. 
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4 Implications of the Dominican withdrawal (legal and political 
consequences) 
I established in the previous Chapter that the withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the 
Court by the Dominican State based on the judgment from its Constitutional Tribunal 
would breach a series of principles and rules of international, Inter-American, and 
Dominican law. Moreover, that the Constitutional judgment does not legitimately free 
the Dominican Republic from its obligation to comply with proceedings and rulings 
from the Court in the cases in which it has been party or is yet to be. 
For that reason, in the present Chapter I will analyze the implications the Do-
minican withdrawal would have for the protection for human rights in the Dominican 
Republic and the Inter-American system, and its political consequences for the Domini-
can Republic. 
4.1 Implications for the protection of human rights 
4.1.1 Deprivation of an international instance 
In November 2014, a group of more than fifty organizations belonging to the 
International Coalition of Organizations for Human Rights in the Americas made a joint 
statement in response to the Constitutional judgment. The Coalition that includes 
Amnesty International and the Center for Justice and International expressed their 
rejection to the decision and warned that its application would hinder the access to the 
Court for all victims of human rights violations in the Dominican Republic, what would 
close their last door for accessing justice.194 
As expressed by the NGOs, the most obvious consequence of the eventual Do-
minican withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction would constitute the abrupt depriva-
tion of all persons under the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic from the opportuni-
ty to find relief at the highest organ for the protection of human rights in the continent. 
In the short term, the Dominican withdrawal could lead to the non-recognition of the 
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binding character of the Court’s decision in the Case of Expelled Dominican and Hai-
tian, what would perpetuate the violations committed against the victims in this case. 
4.1.2 Implications for the Inter-American Court system 
In a broader perspective, independently from whether the Dominican Republic finally 
decides to elude the ruling of the Court based on the Constitutional judgment or not, I 
consider that the sole decision has a negative impact on the consolidation of the Inter-
American human rights system. Unfortunately, the Dominican example reminds us that, 
close to the fourth decade from the creation of the Court, it still faces the strong 
opposition of several members of the OAS, including those who have already adopted 
the ACHR and recognized its jurisdiction. Regrettably, the Dominican example seems 
to demonstrate that the regional human rights system still has to overcome the 
difficulties it has faced in the past. 
Additionally, the Dominican case is far from being the first attempt of with-
drawal or consummated withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Court. Under this unfor-
tunate context, we cannot ignore the possibility that other States decide to follow the 
route used by the Dominican Republic through its Constitutional Tribunal. Particularly, 
if taking into account that some countries, which are currently part of the court system, 
have expressed the possibility of withdrawing. 
4.1.3 Implications for the Inter-American Commission system 
When the Venezuelan denunciation of the ACHR entered into force in 2013, the 
Commission through a press release made it clear for Venezuela that the denunciation 
of the Convention did not imply the withdrawal from the competence of the 
Commission.195 It is important to remember that the Commission is an organ created 
since the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter) in order to 
“promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative 
organ of the Organization in these matters.”196 Therefore, whereas the Court has only 
competence over those States parties to the ACHR and which have made a declaration 
recognizing its jurisdiction, the Commission has competence to entertain 
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communications concerning any State member of the OAS.197 That is the reason why 
countries that have not ratified the ACHR, like the United States, and countries that 
have denounced it, like Trinidad and Tobago, are under the competence of the 
Commission. Therefore, the only form to withdraw from the Commission’s competence 
would be through the withdrawal from the whole OAS system. 
Consequently, even if the Dominican Republic insists in eluding the Court’s ju-
risdiction based on its Constitutional ruling, and even if opts for the denunciation of the 
ACHR, it would remain bound to the proceedings of the Commission. In this unfortu-
nate scenario, the Commission would become in the last resort within the Inter-
American system for the protection of alleged violation of human rights committed by 
the Dominican State. The Commission would continue with the release of its views on 
the cases brought by individuals under the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic, 
though without the possibility of a further submission to the Court. 
4.2 Implications for the Dominican Government 
4.2.1 Sanctions? 
It has been approximately six months since the Constitutional Tribunal released the 
judgment TC/0256/14, and within approximately five months, the Dominican Republic 
shall inform the Court about its compliance with the ruling in the Case of Expelled 
Dominicans and Haitians. During this period, several organizations have pronounced 
against the decision from the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal. The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed its “deep concern about [the] 
ruling”,198 and a number of NGOs in the Latin-American region have condemned the 
Constitutional ruling.199 However, among the organs of the OAS, only the Commission 
has openly expressed itself against the Constitutional ruling of the Dominican Republic 
through a press release.200 Under this scenario, what are the possibilities for any 
effective response against the Dominican Republic at the Inter-American level? 
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One of the biggest differences between the Inter-American system and the 
European system resides in the fact that the latter is endowed with a political machinery 
for the supervision of State compliance with the ECtHR’s judgments, through the 
Committee of Ministers.201 In contrast, the Inter-American legal framework only allows 
the Court to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the OAS in which it 
can express “pertinent recommendations.”202 Lacking a strong political mechanism of 
supervision, the IACtHR has attributed to itself the power to monitor its own 
judgments.203 Unfortunately, the reality is that the IACtHR is alone in its judicial 
monitoring since it is not accompanied by any political measure by the other organs of 
the OAS. Thus, in the absence of a powerful mechanism for the supervision of the 
Court’s judgment, as Pasqualucci mentions, if the States do not implement the ordered 
measures, the Court’s decisions become “merely illusory and more akin to declaratory 
judgments.”204 
The lack of political response by the OAS in the previous purported withdrawals 
from the Court’s jurisdiction, like in the Peruvian case of 1999,205 demonstrates that the 
OAS is not willing to take any political role in those situations. Perhaps, this is even 
understandable, because if the Inter-American States are pressured too much, they could 
simply opt for the complete denunciation of the ACHR, and in that way end with all 
their obligations under the regional human rights treaty altogether, as Venezuela did in 
2013, something (unfortunately) possible because the fact of being Party to the ACHR 
is not a membership requisite of the OAS, as it has become for the Council of 
Europe.206 The rather weak legal framework for the enforceability of human rights 
judgments, may be part of reasons why the Latin-American States find it easier to 
challenge the authority of the Court. 
In fact, by looking to the situations in which the OAS has implemented strong 
political measures, we find that they are reserved only for very exceptional situations. 
Examples include the suspension of Cuba as member of the Organization after the 
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Missile Crisis in 1962,207 and the more recent suspension of Honduras after the coup of 
2009.208 However, the current Dominican case is far from a comparable situation to the 
previously mentioned, and consequently the possibilities for any similar measure are 
almost non-existent. 
In light of the above, political or diplomatic sanctions from the OAS against the 
Dominican Republic seem unlikely. Therefore, probably the Court will have to maintain 
the judgments on its docket,209 until the Dominican Republic decides to return, as Peru 
did at the end of the Fujimori regime. Regrettably, that seems to be the only hope. 
Finally, it is important to use the Dominican example as a reminder of the need 
for the strengthening of the Inter-American human rights system towards a better com-
pliance with the ACHR obligations and the decisions from the Commission and the 
Court. 
4.2.2 Scrutiny under other judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms 
In virtue of the deprivation of an international instance for the protection of human 
rights for the individuals in the Dominican Republic product of that situation, I consider 
important to stand out that that the Dominican State will remind under the scrutiny of 
other international instances. In particular, the Dominican Republic has recognized the 
competence of the Human Rights Committee,210 the Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women,211 and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,212 to consider individual complaints alleging the violations of the 
concerned conventions. 
In addition, there is a legal possibility for Haiti to bring the Dominican Republic 
before the ICJ for breaches to international human rights treaties. For example, both 
States are parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Both treaties establish a clause allowing 
States parties to refer disputes related to the interpretation and application thereof to the 
ICJ,213 and neither the Dominican Republic nor Haiti made a reservation on those 
clauses. Thus, both States have consented to the possible referral to the ICJ. 
Therefore, even after the Dominican withdrawal from the Court, there will be 
other international instances available, alongside the Commission, in monitoring of the 
realization of human rights in the Dominican Republic. 
4.3 Final remarks on the implications of the Dominican withdrawal 
I consider that as in the Peruvian purported withdrawal of 1999, the Court will likely 
defend its jurisdiction by reference to some of the principles of international law I have 
addressed in Chapter 3. However, based on the previous experiences in the Inter-
American system, I can anticipate that there will be no political or diplomatic actions by 
the General Assembly of the OAS in support of the difficult task of the Court to prevent 
the Dominican Republic from leaving the regional court system and avoiding its 
obligations under the ADHR. Hence, the Dominican withdrawal, clearly contrary to 
principles and rules of international and Inter-American law, could potentially happen 
without major legal or political international repercussions for the Dominican State. 
Regrettably, as usual the most affected by this sort of decisions are the individu-
als. The people under the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic will be deprived of the 
most important international instance available in Latin-America for the protection of 
their fundamental rights. Nevertheless, even after its unilateral withdrawal from the 
Court’s jurisdiction and giving no recognition to its judgments, the Dominican State 
will not totally elude the possibility to be brought again before other internationals judi-
cial or quasi-judicial bodies for its human rights violations. Therefore, I consider that 
the Dominican Government should take into account that regardless its withdrawal from 
the IACtHR, it will remain bound to regional and international scrutiny of its human 
rights record. Instead of avoiding in international obligations under international and 
regional human rights law and the Dominican Constitution, the Dominican government 
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should engage in an open dialogue with national, regional and international actors so as 
to find a suitable solution regarding respecting the rights of the population of Haitian 
origin living in the Dominican Republic. 
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Conclusions 
i) Concluding remarks 
With about five months to go for the Dominican Republic to submit to the Court the 
information of its compliance with the judgment in the Case of Expelled Dominicans 
and Haitians there is no express statement from the Dominican Government on whether 
it will (or has already) withdraw from the Court’s jurisdiction based on its 
Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling TC/0256/14 of November 2014. Nevertheless, from the 
analysis of the Constitutional judgment in conjunction with the statements from the 
Dominican Foreign Minister, I consider that it seems highly probable to conclude that 
the Dominican Government will opt for the withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction 
(Chapter 1). 
Additionally, the particular time in which the Constitutional judgment was 
rendered; the context under which it was decided; the manifest opposition of the 
Dominican Government against the recent judgment from the IACtHR; and the express 
mention by one the judges from the Constitutional Tribunal, suggest that the judgment 
TC/0256/14 was more an act of reaction against the ruling from the IACtHR than a 
legal reasoning. In fact, the regional context demonstrates that although it is the first 
time a country invalidates the Instrument of Recognition of the IACtHR’s jurisdiction 
through a Constitutional Review, it would not be the first time a country in the region 
opts for similar alternatives to elude the compliance with the Court’s judgments 
(Chapter 2).  
Therefore, the particular circumstances of the Dominican situation calls for a 
proper legal evaluation of its compliance with international, Inter-American, and 
Dominican law. This evaluation was the core research question of my thesis, which I 
addressed in Chapter 3 in three main sections. 
Firstly, I analyzed whether the requisite of ratification or legislative approval 
was necessary for the Instrument of Recognition to be valid and bind the Dominican 
Republic to the Court’s jurisdiction. After looking at the ACHR and the last three 
National Constitutions of the Dominican Republic, I concluded that the act of 
recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction (a non-autonomous unilateral act) does not 
require such formality neither under the ACHR, nor under Dominican law to be valid. 
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In fact, the only requisite established by Article 62(2) ACHR is the notification to the 
Secretary General of the OAS which was duly complied with. Therefore, the Instrument 
of Recognition cannot be legitimately invalidated due to the lack of a requirement not 
established under any body of norms (Chapter 3.1). 
Secondly, I also analyzed whether given the specific hierarchy of international 
undertakings, particularly human rights, the obligations derived from the ACHR and the 
unilateral act of recognition should prevail over domestic/Dominican law in case of 
conflict. In my analysis, I referred to a series of provisions and judgments that 
confirmed that international obligations should prevail. I also found that the 
developments of the IACtHR, and increasingly the case-law of the Latin-American 
States, recognize the higher hierarchy of the ACHR over domestic law. Moreover, it 
was particularly relevant to find that the Dominican Constitution itself recognizes 
constitutional rank to international human rights obligations. Additionally, the 
Dominican Constitution does not authorize the Constitutional Tribunal to review the 
constitutionality of international treaties after ratification, but only before ratification. 
Therefore, the conclusion was that the invalidation of the Instrument of Recognition 
would be contrary to the Dominican Constitution. Even if in accordance with the 
Constitution, this would not excuse the Dominican Republic from its international 
human rights obligations. Thus, the country shall remain bound to the Court’s 
jurisdiction (Chapter 3.2). 
Thirdly, I also analyzed whether the withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the 
Court would breach other principles and provisions of international and Inter-American 
law, namely compétence de la compétence, the rules of invalidity of treaties, good faith, 
pacta sunt servanda, estoppel and forum prorogatum.  
My findings confirm that under the principle compétence de la compétence, it is 
within the power of the Court to decide on any issue concerning its own jurisdiction. 
Clearly, the validity of the Instrument of Recognition is an issue related to its 
jurisdiction, and it should be the Court itself, which decides on that issue. Otherwise, 
the Court would be subject to the whims of States. For that reason, the invalidation by 
the Constitutional Tribunal would deprive the Court from its power to decide on its 
jurisdiction, in a clear breach of the principle of compétence de la competence (Chapter 
3.3.1). 
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Additionally, my analysis of the analogical application of the rules of invalidity 
of treaties for the unilateral act of Recognition of the Court’s competence suggests that 
the alleged invalidity thereof does not reach the strict requisites set forth by the VCLT. 
On the one hand, there was no breach of a domestic legal provision of fundamental 
importance as required by Article 46(1) VCLT because there is no provision 
whatsoever in any of the three analyzed constitutions requiring the legislative approval 
for unilateral acts. On the other hand, even if there is such a requisite under domestic 
law, it cannot be affirmed that it was objectively evident as required by Article 46(2) 
VCLT because, at the international level, unilateral acts are not required to follow such 
formality. Additionally, given that many actors (victims, Commission, Court, etc.) have 
relied in good faith on the declaration contained in the Instrument of Recognition, the 
Dominican Republic cannot simply ignore the authority and rulings of the Court. On the 
contrary, it would (anyhow) be obliged to comply with all acts done in good faith in 
reliance of the Instrument of Recognition pursuant to Article 62(2) VCLT. In sum, it 
can hardly be affirmed that the Dominican situation reaches the requirements under the 
VCLT for the invalidity of treaties, thus the exemption for the principle pacta sunt 
servanda pursuant to Articles 27 and 46 VCLT is not fulfilled (Chapter 3.3.2). 
Additionally, I also concluded that after 16 years of consent and acquiescence of 
the jurisdiction of the Court by the Dominican Republic, the principle of estoppel would 
prohibit the State from unilaterally withdrawing its consent in detriment of the other 
parties to the contentious cases. Whereas, with regard to the principle forum proroga-
tum, I found that the Court may rely on it to entertain cases against the Dominican Re-
public even if the Instrument of Recognition is void (Chapter 3.3.3).  
In sum, the Constitutional judgment and the eventual Dominican withdrawal 
from the jurisdiction of the Court would contravene provisions and principles of inter-
national, Inter-American, and Dominican law. Furthermore, the withdrawal has signifi-
cant deleterious consequences for the protection of human rights in the Dominican Re-
public and potentially in the region. The most significant negative consequence, namely 
the abrupt deprivation of access to the Inter-American court system is detrimental to all 
persons under the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic, and would constitute an un-
fortunate setback for the consolidation of the regional human rights system (Chapter 4). 
ii) Further research 
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One of the conclusions of Chapter 4 is that based on the previous experiences of with-
drawals in the region, the Dominican Republic will very likely receive no political pres-
sure from the political organs of the OAS. Therefore, again the Court will have to face 
alone the Dominican attack on its jurisdiction, probably just with the support of the 
Commission. For that reason, I consider that the present Dominican withdrawal is a 
good reminder that the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights needs 
to be endowed with more political tools to really ensure the compliance with the deci-
sions from the Court and the implementation of the reports from the Commission. Thus, 
I consider that once we get to know the outcome of the ongoing Dominican situation, a 
deeper legal and political study on the necessary changes to strengthen the Inter-
American system will indubitably constitute a very useful research for the protection of 
human rights in the region. 
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Annex: 2010 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, Santo 
Domingo, Official Gazette 26 January 2010 (In force)214 
 
Artículo 3.- Inviolabilidad de la soberanía y principio de no intervención. La sober-
anía de la Nación dominicana, Estado libre e independiente de todo poder extranjero, es 
inviolable. Ninguno de los poderes públicos organizados por la presente Constitución 
puede realizar o permitir la realización de actos que constituyan una intervención direc-
ta o indirecta en los asuntos internos o externos de la República Dominicana o una in-
jerencia que atente contra la personalidad e integridad del Estado y de los atributos que 
se le reconocen y consagran en esta Constitución. El principio de la no intervención 
constituye una norma invariable de la política internacional dominicana. 
Article 3.- Inviolability of sovereignty and the principle of no intervention. The sovereignty of 
the Dominican Nation, a State free and independent of any foreign power, is inviolable. None of 
the public powers organized by this Constitution may realize or permit the realization of acts that 
constitute a direct or indirect intervention in the internal or external affairs of the Dominican Re-
public or an interference that infringes the personality and integrity of the State and of the attrib-
utes that are recognized and consecrated in this Constitution. The principle of non-intervention 
constitutes an invariable norm of Dominican international policy. 
Artículo 4.- Gobierno de la Nación y separación de poderes. El gobierno de la 
Nación es esencialmente civil, republicano, democrático y representativo. Se divide en 
Poder Legislativo, Poder Ejecutivo y Poder Judicial. Estos tres poderes son inde-
pendientes en el ejercicio de sus respectivas funciones. Sus encargados son re-
sponsables y no pueden delegar sus atribuciones, las cuales son únicamente las determi-
nadas por esta Constitución y las leyes. 
Article 4.- Government of the Nation and separation of Powers. The government of the Nation 
is essentially civil, republican, democratic and representative. It is divided into the Legislative 
Power, the Executive Power and the Judicial Power. These three powers are independent in the 
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exercise of their respective functions. Their office holders are responsible and cannot delegate 
their attributions, which are uniquely determined by this Constitution and laws. 
Artículo 6.- Supremacía de la Constitución. Todas las personas y los órganos que 
ejercen potestades públicas están sujetos a la Constitución, norma suprema y fundamen-
to del ordenamiento jurídico del Estado. Son nulos de pleno derecho toda ley, decreto, 
resolución, reglamento o acto contrarios a esta Constitución. 
Article 6.- Supremacy of the Constitution. All the persons and the organs exercising public 
powers are subject to the Constitution, which is the supreme norm and foundation of the juridical 
order of the State. Any law, decree, resolution, regulation or act that is contrary to this Constitu-
tion is null of plain right. 
Artículo 26.- Relaciones internacionales y derecho internacional. La República Do-
minicana es un Estado miembro de la comunidad internacional, abierto a la cooperación 
y apegado a las normas del derecho internacional, en consecuencia: 1) Reconoce y 
aplica las normas del derecho internacional, general y americano, en la medida en que 
sus poderes públicos las hayan adoptado; 2) Las normas vigentes de convenios internac-
ionales ratificados regirán en el ámbito interno, una vez publicados de manera oficial; 
3) Las relaciones internacionales de la República Dominicana se fundamentan y rigen 
por la afirmación y promoción de sus valores e intereses nacionales, el respeto a los 
derechos humanos y al derecho internacional; 4) En igualdad de condiciones con otros 
Estados, la República Dominicana acepta un ordenamiento jurídico internacional que 
garantice el respeto de los derechos fundamentales, la paz, la justicia, y el desarrollo 
político, social, económico y cultural de las naciones. Se compromete a actuar en el 
plano internacional, regional y nacional de modo compatible con los intereses nacion-
ales, la convivencia pacífica entre los pueblos y los deberes de solidaridad con todas las 
naciones […]. 
Article 26.- International relations and international law. The Dominican Republic is a mem-
ber State of the international community, open to cooperation and attached to the norms of interna-
tional law, in consequence: 1. It recognizes and applies the norms of international, general and 
American law, in the manner in which its public powers have adopted it; 2. The norms in force of 
ratified international agreements will govern within the domestic sphere, once they have been pub-
lished in official manner; 3. The international relations of the Dominican Republic are founded 
and governed by the affirmation and promotion of its national values and interests, the respect for 
human rights and for international law; 4. In equal conditions with other States, the Dominican 
Republic accepts an international juridical order that guarantees the respect for fundamental rights, 
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peace, justice, and the political, social, economic and cultural development of the nations. It un-
dertakes to act in the international, regional and national levels in a manner compatible with the 
national interests, a peaceful coexistence among peoples and the duties of solidarity with all na-
tions […]. 
Artículo 73.- Nulidad de los actos que subviertan el orden constitucional. Son nulos 
de pleno derecho los actos emanados de autoridad usurpada, las acciones o decisiones 
de los poderes públicos, instituciones o personas que alteren o subviertan el orden con-
stitucional y toda decisión acordada por requisición de fuerza armada. 
Article 73.- Nullity of the acts that subvert the constitutional order. The acts issued by usurped 
authority, and the actions or decisions of the public powers, institutions or persons that alter or 
subvert the constitutional order and any decision reached by requisition of armed force, are null of 
plain right. 
Artículo 74.- Principios de reglamentación e interpretación. La interpretación y re-
glamentación de los derechos y garantías fundamentales, reconocidos en la presente 
Constitución, se rigen por los principios siguientes: […] 3. Los tratados, pactos y con-
venciones relativos a derechos humanos, suscritos y ratificados por el Estado domini-
cano, tienen jerarquía constitucional y son de aplicación directa e inmediata por los tri-
bunales y demás órganos del Estado […]. 
Article 74.- Principles of regulation and interpretation. The interpretation and regulation of the 
fundamental rights and guarantees, recognized in this Constitution, shall be governed by the fol-
lowing principles: […] 3. The treaties, pacts and conventions concerning human rights, subscribed 
and ratified by the Dominican State, have constitutional hierarchy and are of direct and immediate 
application by the tribunals and other organs of the State […]. 
Artículo 93.- Atribuciones. El Congreso Nacional legisla y fiscaliza en representación 
del pueblo, le corresponden en consecuencia: 1) Atribuciones generales en materia leg-
islativa: […] l) Aprobar o desaprobar los tratados y convenciones internacionales que 
suscriba el Poder Ejecutivo; […]. 
 Article 93.- Attributions. The National Congress legislates and supervises in representation of 
the people, and as a consequence it corresponds to it: 1. General attributions in legislative matters: 
[…] l. To approve or to disapprove the international treaties and conventions subscribed by the 
Executive Power […]. 
Artículo 128.- Atribuciones del Presidente de la República. La o el Presidente de la 
República dirige la política interior y exterior, la administración civil y militar, y es la 
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autoridad suprema de las Fuerzas Armadas, la Policía Nacional y los demás cuerpos de 
seguridad del Estado. 1) En su condición de Jefe de Estado le corresponde: […] d) Cel-
ebrar y firmar tratados o convenciones internacionales y someterlos a la aprobación del 
Congreso Nacional, sin la cual no tendrán validez ni obligarán a la República; […]. 
Article 128.- Attributions of the President of the Republic. The [feminine or masculine] Presi-
dent of the Republic directs the internal and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, 
and is the supreme authority of the Armed Forces, of the National Police and the other security 
bodies of the State. 1. In the condition of Head of State it corresponds to him to: […] d. Celebrate 
and sign treaties or international conventions and submit them to the approval of the National 
Congress, without which they would not be valid or obligate the Republic […]. 
